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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
STATE OF IDAHO L 
County of Bonner .,. 
fILED In· fa 
AT 10:)1 O'fLOCK Q M 
CLERK ~~ISTRlCtCoURt 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
SECOND AMENDED ANSWER, 
COUNTERCLAIM and CROSS 
CLAIM 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, husband and wife, (hereinafter 
"Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby amends their Answer as 
follows: 
I. ANSWER 
1. Defendants hereby deny each, every, and all allegations and representations set 
forth in Plaintiffs Petition unless specifically admitted herein. 
2. In answer to Paragraphs 1,2,5,6, 13, 14 and16 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants 
are withoul ~ufticient information to fonn a belief as to the truth of the matters alleged therein 
and therefore deny the same. 
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3. In answer to Paragraphs 3, 4 and·8 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit the 
same. 
4. In answer to Paragraph 7, of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that a 
contract was entered into, and that the contract speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remainder 
of said Paragraph. 
5. In answer to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that Rimar 
perfonned work on the Donnelly Residence, and deny the remainder of said Paragraph. 
6. In answer to Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit 
only that Plaintiffs Verified Petition in Bonner County Case No. CV-06-00445 (and any 
subsequent amendments thereto) speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remainder of said 
Paragraphs. 
7. In answer to Paragraphs 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of 
Plaintiff s Petition, Defendants deny the same. 
TI. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
8. Defendants incorporate as affinnative defenses the allegations contained ill 
Paragraphs 1-7, above. 
9. Plaintiffhas failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
10. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the equitable doctrines of waiver, laches, unclean 
hands, and in pari delicto. 
11. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of estoppel. 
12. Plaintiffs claims are barred due to failure of a condition precedent. 
13. Plaintiffhas failed to join an indispensable party. 
14. The losses and claims asserted by the Defendants against Rimar Construction Inc. 
and Ivan Rimar are not excluded from coverage ofEMC's policy. 




15. At times material hereto, the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company 
("EMC"), is and was an Iowa corporation authorized to conduct the business of selling 
insurance, including commercial general liability insurance, in the State ofIdaho. 
16. At times material hereto, the Defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI") is and 
was an Idaho corporation that was engaged in the business of providing general contracting 
services in the State of Idaho. 
17. At times material hereto, the Defendants, David and Kathy Donnelly 
("Donnelly"), hired RCI to provide general contracting services for improvements to their real 
property located in Bonner County, State ofIdaho. 
18. On or about September 14, 2004, EMC sold and RCI purchased commercial 
general liability policy no. 2DI-32-95-05 ("CGL Policy") with the effective coverage dates 
identified as October 1,2004, up and through October 1,2005. 
19. On or about March 7, 2006, the Donnellys filed suit against RCI for claims 
arising out of and related to RCI undertaking to provide general contracting services for certain 
improvements to the Donnelly property and arising during the effective coverage dates in EMC 
CGL Policy in Bonner County Case Number CV-06-00445 (herein "Underlying Litigation"). 
The Underlying Litigation was litigated through trial resulting in a jury verdict in Donnelly's 
favor as against RCI on or about July 9, 2008. 
20. On or about August 14, 2008, in the Underlying Litigation a Judgment On 
Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant Rirnar Construction, Inc. 
("Initial Judgment") was entered in the amount of $128,611.55 to accrue interest at the legal rate 
against RCI in favor of Donnelly. Later, on March 20, 2009, in the Underlying Litigation an 
Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant 
Rirnar Construction, Inc. / Rule 54(b) Certificate ("Amended Judgment") was entered in the total 
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amount of $425,545.44 including an award of the Donnellys' attorney's fees in the amount of 
$277,062.00 and costs in the amount of$19,871.89. 
21. On or about March 30, 2009, the Amended Judgment was properly recorded in 
Bonner County, State of Idaho, as record instrument #769177. 
22. Pursuant to its policy of insurance, EMC defended RCI through the trial in the 
Underlying Litigation. Having undertaken the defense of its insured, EMC knew and recognized 
the Donnellys as claimants against RCI's commercial genera1liability policy. In addition, RCI 
knew and/or expected that the Donnellys would incur costs and attorney's fees to prosecute its 
claim against RCI. 
23. On or about May 24, 2007, EMC initiated this action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that, under the EMC COL Policy, it has no contractual duty to pay, in whole or in part, 
any of the Donnellys' then claims as against RCI. On or about December 12,2007, this action 
was stayed pending the outcome of the Underlying Litigation. The stay in this action was later 
lifted on or about July 17,2009. 
24. Following a trial and entry of a jury verdict in the Underlying Litigation, the 
Donnellys are judgment creditors ofRCI and have a claim, right or interest including ajudgment 
lien right, in whole or in part, to the proceeds or policy benefits from the EMC COL Policy due 
and owing to RCI in whole or partial satisfaction of the Donnellys' judgment against RCI. 
25. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1202, the Donnellys are persons interested under 
the EMC COL Policy whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the policy and, 
therefore, request a construction of the EMC COL Policy to obtain a declaration of their rights, 
status or other legal relations under the policy. In particular, the Donnellys seek a declaration 
that EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnify RCI, in whole or in part, for the 
Donnelly judgment including, but not limited to, post-judgment interest accrued to date on the 
entire judgment. 
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26. To date, neither EMC nor RCI has made any payment to Donnelly or to the Court 
in effort to satisfy the Donnelly judgment in whole or in part and the Donnelly judgment remains 
unsatisfied. 
B. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
27. The Defendants/Counterclaimants, David and Kathy Donnelly, re-allege 
paragraphs 15-26 as if set forth herein. 
28. On March 20, 2009, in the Underlying Litigation an Amended Judgment in the 
total amount of $425,545.44 was awarded in favor of Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly and 
against Defendant RCI. On or about March 30, 2009, the Amended Judgment was properly 
recorded in Bonner County, State of Idaho, as record instrument #769177. A true and correct 
copy of the Amended Judgment, Bonner County Record Instrument # 769177 is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A and is adopted by reference pursuant to IRep 1 O( c). 
29. Following entry of the Initial Judgment and Amended Judgment, the Donnellys 
were and are judgment creditors of RCI. The Amended Judgment recorded as a judgment lien 
against the real property, if any, of RCI pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1110 and rendered the real 
and personal property ofRCI liable to seizure pursuant to Idaho Code § 11-201. 
30. The Plaintiff, EMC, had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the Initial 
Judgment and Amended Judgment awarded in favor of the Donnellys and against its insured, 
ReI, having tendered a defense to RCI and Ivan Rimar, individually, in the Underlying 
Litigation and having initiated this declaratory judgment action against the named Defendants 
herein. As a result, EMC, knew or should have known that the Donnellys had a legal and/or 
equitable right in the real and/or personal property ofRCI liable to pay the Amended Judgment. 
In particular, EMC knew the Donnellys were the beneficiaries and/or intended beneficiaries of 
insurance benefits and/or monies owed by EMC to ReI under EMC's Commercial General 
Liability ("CGL") policies 2D1-32-95-05 and 2D1-32-95-06 with RCI. 
31. rae Defendant, RCI, had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the Initial 
Judgment and Amended Judgment awarded against it having defended the Underlying Litigation 
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through trial. As a result, RCI knew, or should have known, that the Donnellys had a legal 
and/or equitable right in the real and/or personal property of RCI liable to pay the Amended 
Judgment. In particular, RCI knew the Donnellys were the beneficiaries and/or intended 
beneficiaries of insurance benefits and/or monies owed by EMC to RCI under EMC's 
Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policies 2D 1-32-95-05 and 2D 1-32-95-06. 
32. On or about March 30, 2009, the Defendant RCI, a judgment debtor of the 
Donnellys, had a contract claim to certain policy benefits or monies against EMC pursuant to 
EMC's CGL policies. In particular, RCI had a claim that EMC indemnify it, in whole or in part, 
against the Donnellys' Amended Judgment pursuant to the terms of its CGL policies. 
33. In addition, on or about March 30, 2009, the Defendant RCI, a judgment debtor 
of the Donnellys, had a pending counterclaim seeking money damages against EMC. In part, 
RCI's counterclaim against EMC included causes of action for insurance bad faith and breach of 
contract. 
34. Sometime in September of 2009, EMC and RCI entered into a Settlement 
Agreement with a stated effective date of August 17,2009. In part,.the Settlement Agreement 
purports to be a transfer of RCI's property right in its contract claims against the EMC CGL 
policy and its pending counterclaim to EMC. A true and correct copy of the Settlement 
Agreement produced by EMC as Exhibit J to the Affidavit of James G. Reid is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B" and adopted by reference pursuant to IRCP 10( c). 
35. EMC, RCI and Ivan Rimar, individually, entered into the Settlement Agreement 
with no notice to David or Kathy Donnelly and the Donnellys are not parties to the Settlement 
Agreement. 
36. On November 10, 2009, the Donnellys caused a Writ of Execution to issue from 
the Clerk of the Bonner County Court under the Underlying Litigation case number to seek 
collection against RCI on the Amended Judgment. Along with the Writ of Execution, a letter 
with Instructions to the Sheriff was sent· to the Bonner County Sheriff for the purposes of 
collecting on the Amended Judgment. A true and correct copy of the letter with Instructions to 
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the· Sheriff without its attachments is attached hereto as Exhibit C and adopted by reference 
pursuant to IRCP 10( c) and a true and correct copy of the Writ of Execution is attached hereto as 
Exhibit D and adopted by reference pursuant to IRCP 10( c). 
37. Following execution on the Writ of Execution by the Bonner County Sheriff, the 
Donnellys received a copy of a·Memorandum dated November 24, 2009, from counsel for RCI 
to the Bonner County Sheriff that, in part, represented as follows: Please be advised that RIMAR 
CONSTRUCTION, INC. owns no property, real or personal. Further, RIMAR 
CONSTRUCTION, INC. owns no equipment, heavy equipment, titled or untitled motor 
vehicles, tools, receivables, inventory, or any other personal property of any description. A true 
and correct copy of the Memorandum from RCI to the Bonner County Sheriff dated November 
24, 2009 is attached hereto as Exhibit E and adopted by reference pursuant to IRCP (c). 
38. On or about December 7, 2009, the Bonner County Sheriff returned the Writ of 
Ex~cution unsatisfied. A true and correct copy of the return on the Writ of Execution from the 
Bonner County Sheriff's Office is attached hereto as Exhibit F and adopted by reference 
pursuant to IRCP 1 O( c). In particular, the Sheriff was unable to or could not levy on: 
a. Notice and attachment of all right and interest injudgment debtor's claims 
to insurance benefits and/or monies from Employers Mutual Casualty Company Commercial 
General Liability policy number 2D1-032-9S-0S dated October 1,2004 through October 1, 200S 
and policy number 2DI-32-9S-06 dated October 1,2005 through October 1, 2006; and 
b. Notice and attachment of all right and interest in judgment debtor's causes 
of action and/or counterclaim(s) as set forth in Bonner County CV-2007-0088S. 
39. The Settlement Agreement by and between EMC, RCI and Ivan Rimar is 
considered a fraudulent transfer to the Donnellys as judgment creditors ofRCI, as the Settlement 
Agreement purports to be a transfer made by RCI after the debt obligation to the Donnellys was 
incurred and was made with (a) the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the Donnellys, or (b) 
was made without receiving a reasonably equivalent value from EMC L'1 exchange for the 
transfer and, the transfer resulted in RCI having little or no assets remaining and/or left ReI 
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otherwise insolvent and unable to satisfY the Donnellys' Amended Judgment in contravention of 
Idaho Code §§ 55-913(1)(a); 55-913(b) and 55-914(1). 
40. As a result of the transfer by and between EMC and RCI set forth in the 
Settlement Agreement, the Donnellys have been damaged and are entitled to the remedy of 
creditors as set forth in Idaho Code § 55-916 et. seq. including the avoidance of the transfers 
from RCI to EMC set forth in the Settlement Agreement and the attachment, levy and execution 
on the transferred property in favor of the Donnellys in partial satisfaction of their Amended 
Judgment. 
41. The Donnellys have retained the law fIrm of Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, and have 
incurred attorney's fees and costs in defense and prosecution of this action. 
NOW WHEREFORE, Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly pray for the following 
relief: 
1. That the Plaintiff's Petition be dismissed in its entirety and that it take nothing 
thereby; 
2. That the Defendant Donnelly have declaratory judgment finding that under the 
EMC CGL policies, EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnifY RCI, in whole or in 
part, the Donnellys' Amended Judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation and including 
post-judgment interest on the entire judgment amount; 
3. That the Settlement Agreement by and between EMC, RCI and Ivan Rimar be 
avoided with regard to the transfer of property from RCI to EMC and that the court order 
levy and execution on the transferred property and/or its proceeds in favor of Donnelly in 
accord with Idaho Code § 55-916 et. seq.; 
4. That the Defendants Donnelly be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs as 
incurred herein pursuant to I.e. §§ 10-1201 et seq.; 12-120 and 12-121; and 41-1839; and 
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5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this /J-day of July, 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
Irm 
Attorneys for Defen ants Donnelly 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the/hay of July, 2010, I served a tme and conect copy 
;-ofthe foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
VlJSMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 342-4657 
VUSMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (509) 625-1909 
VUSMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 263-0400 
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beard'th~ evidenc~ and havj'pgJ t~))~ete~ a verdict on.July 9, 2Q,08, lOy' way of Special Verdict, 
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IT IS HSREBY ORJ:)~i.~ltJDGBl) .AND DEGlWpD::tb;atjudgment be entered as 
fonows: • • 
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in dplJla&i;s, 
2. That with respec& to the.:OonneUys' oUum of ~Pt~ss WBr-rai.lty against Rimar 
c:Oi1sb:,ucil'OQ, lpQ.;. tli~ j.ur>.: did not find any sqch 'breach, arid' t1ierefdr~ Judgment is 
rel\dei:~~Ur.;tay.o.Ei~t:-.Rim~CQnstruction, Inc. 
l. That w'i'tJi·;teSl'~ct"tQ· tbe OonneJlys' claim ofbrea~h of impl!ed W$Tanty Qfworkmansbip, , 
thejUry fOlpld: s~ch ~. btej~li' and awarded the" sum of $,126,61 i .5S, ~d Judgment is 
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entered in favor of the Donnellys in the amount of $126,611.55 against Rimar 
Construction, Inc. 
4. That with respect to the Donnellys' claims for violatio~ of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act against Rimar Construction, Inc., concerning the specific disclosures by a 
general contractor, the jury detennined that the failure to make such disclosures 
constituted a violation of the Consumer Protection Act and awarded $1,000.00 for the 
failure to provide such disclosures, and Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the 
Donnellys in the amount of$1,OOO.00. 
S. That with respect to other alleged violations of the Consumer Protection Act brought by 
. the Donnellys against Rimar Construction, Inc., the jury found that such a violation 
o~cmred anq. awarded damages in the amount of $1,000.00, and Judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of the DonneUys in the amount of$1,OOO.00. 
6. That with respect to the Donnellrs' claim for negligence against Rimar Construction Inc. 
as an architect the jmy found that Rimar Construction Inc. did not act as an architect and 
therefore, there is no liability under that theory and Judgment is rendered in favor of 
Rimar Construction, Inc. on the architectural negligence cause of action. 
7. That with respect to the Donnellys' claim of alleged engineering negligence against 
Rimar Construction, Inc., the jury found that Rimar Construction, Inc" did not act as an 
engineer and therefore, fOood no liability. Accordingly, Judgment is rendered in favor of 
Rimar Construction, inc., on the engineering negligence cause of action. 
8. That with respect to Rimar Construction, Inc.' s claims against Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly for 
breach of contract, the Court has detennined that the Donnellys were excused from 
perfonnance of the Contract, and that Rlmar Construction, Inc. is not entitled to an award 
of any damages. 
9. That with respect to Rimar Construction, Inc.'s claims against Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly for 
foreclosure of its mechanic's and materialmen's lien under I.C. 45-501 et seq., thejury 
and Court have detennined that Rimar Construction Inc. failed to establish its right to 
foreclose said lien. Accordingly, Judgment is rendered in favor of the Donnellys on the 
lien foreclosure cause of action. The Claim of Lien filed as Bonner County Instrument 
No. 695132, and the Lis Pendens filed as Bonner County Instrument No. 702306, are 
therefore declared to be of no legal effect, and are hereby expunged. 




10. That Plaintiffs / Counterclaim Defendants David and Kathy Dopnelly; as the prevailing 
party against Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc., recover from Defendant Rimar 
Construction, Inc. attorney's fees in the amount of$277,062.00 and costs in the amount 
of $19,871.89, for a total recovery against Defendant Rimar ConStruction, Inc. in the sum 
of $425,545.44. which shall accrue interest at the legal rate as provided by Idaho Code 
§ 28-22-104(2) from the date of entry of jUdgment 
DATEnthi~of ~ 
~~~ 
STEVE VERBY, ~ 
District Judge 
RULE54~)CERTDnCATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule S4(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has detennined that there is 
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby 
direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may 
issue and an appeal may~ ~aken by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED thi~d;y of.,.L..;..~ __ ~~009. i£A#-
STEVE VERBY, ~­
District 'udge 
AMENDED JUDG.MENT / RULE S4(b) CERTIFICATE 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the t:1kday of 'trJ4~ ,200---1 I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated be oW; and addressed to all counsel of 
record as follows: 
Brent C. Featherston g/ U.S.MaU 
Pea1herston Law Pirm 0 Hand Delivered 
113 South Second Avenue 0 Overnight Mail 
Sandpoint, lD 83864 0 Telecopy (FAX) 
Fax: (208) 265-1713 
Chris H. Hansen g/ U.S. Mail 
Anderson Iulian & Hull, LLP 0 Hand Delivered 
250 South Fifth Street, Ste 700 0 Overnight Mail 
. PO Box 7426 0 Telecopy (FAX) 
BoJse,1O 83707-7426 
Fax: (208) 344-5510 
Michael O. Schmidt a/ U.S. Mail 
wUUam D. Hyslop 0 Hand Delivered 
Lukins & Annis. P.S. 0 Overnight Mail 
250 Northwest Blvd.. Ste. 102 0 Telecopy (PAX) 
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83814-2971 
Fax:(208)6~12S 
Micbacl L. Haman 
r;;r/ U.S. Mail 
Haman Law Office PC 0 Hand Delivered 
923 North 3rd Street 0 Overnight Mail 









J!mploym Mutual C~lty Com~tU'ly, ~ low» Q()Tporalion (hGlrClm 
fflfism to ~ n!MOt?l 
RlI'mU' C01l$tni~tlClJt, Ina., an' IdBho (lgTP~mtlon~ ~md Iymt Rfmar, tID 
b:ldJv.!dulJl (bttrol:t col{eQtJvcly Tf)ferred to III flIUMAR"): 
A,ugl.1:lt 1 ,,/, 2{l09. 
RECI'l'ALS 
A. D~vtd and [<athy D.~J1y {hoRlin coJl~otlvQiy roftIrrtld to M nDONNm Y', 
bl"Qughflesal aotfim agmnst lUMAR in the l'blt Judl~ Distriot COlJl1 Qftlto rmio'Qffdaho. In 
.and for the County ofB(>nuor, Cuo No. CV ·2006-00445 (thi8 !lotion snall ,bl) letorrlKl to bmraln as 
t'h~ ''UNP1iRL YlNG ACTION',), mAldng IJQyoral Jll!egatlom I18llfni~ lUM.AA lIun'ounolns tAe 
desltlJ1 and ftJ.tltldcl ofa honurQwned by nONNm.,LY~ 812d 
S. At 11i" relevant. tJ~eI Involvod In tbe fllaimll Alleged in tho UNDllRL.Ylt:fO 
ACTION; a policy IU'Id a~emcnt oflrun~rMWo e;dBted.betwoen;l3MC! ~ lU¥AA: 41l\d 
C. A. \il$putc tolm~d. and oonUl1uod fQ ~xls~ b~tweQtll3MC and 'P.lMA;R as to 
whether the polioy of in~lll'anoe provIded any ooverne;e for the'Qlafm~ rulesed, jl1 fhl! 
UNDBJU.¥lNO AC'aON, byt neverthclos~ llMC proyldl'd It oornp,leto dlJftmllo to JqMAR il1 the 
~lVmYl:N<;t AC'J'lON;, aM , 
D.' During tbep9TIdcm9yof~bo UNDEIUNrNO.ACTION,.!MC bfQUfM l~gQl R~tln 
. a~insn.UMAA and l)ONNBLt Y to adol'CS3 JSIUI§ ~f CQvcrf!.8o w¢Ot' tho l,loll.o-y of!I.l$\lnUWD. 
uid. ~(lflol'l llcfng omuabt before \be first ·JucllQilll Ol~triot Court ofthC' StAlo of Jdabo.ln mut fof 
tho CQ1tntyofnonncr, Case No. CV!'2tJ07.-o0SS~ (this iotLon ~ball bu~temd to h~fn as th~ 
, ''DliCLARA10R.¥ ACTIONj; and 
:,0 ~. 
EXHIBIT .B 





13, ?rhe tJNDERLYlNO ACTION did mult in JUdgTmmt'beint entor,d Bgllinltt 
lUMARr but only as to'~jmilr Conlltruotion: ~n~ 
F. BMC and lUMA'R. h~v' oome k> lUi agrcentont, thet~nms and Conditions of which 
m'O JI"t fOrtb h(lr~i"r whurcby tho DECLARATORY ACT!ON wiU b, forevor molved liS bctwe,cn 
tltornt and whereby l3MC wUl (lQntlnuo to provido a cioftmse to lUMAR. in wbat remains DftllC 
ONDBRLflNG AC'l,'fON. 
A.GJmEMENT 
WlIEREFOQ the Pnrtles lIokr!owleda, the undemlandingB "xPMSCid 1n ~b" ePQv$ 
Rooi~J" and for good lind vaJuablo (loIlRiae''ation. the reeVlip~ aml 5uftioicmcy of whfoh iii hereby 
aokIJQwlOflged, the parties agree AS follows: 
I, ~ oLPa.l1ltl. '!noident to tbfs A8fO,m~nt. tho follo_ promises aro mQde: 
(II) 'P1!~ rttIJ."JerlS,,4,gj9l!.· BMC ',billl continue t(? pmvfd~.o lUMM a 
tbll.lIDd oomple1o defelJllo ml<llo,eal representation as to all pelldlns,llnresolve(! IU1d,r~ainIl1g 
mldtere Rnd fSSU$p tovolyed in ~h' "QNDBRLW(t ACTION, m~llJdi1l8''UP(J1J IIppealt provid,(1 
h?WtlVBr !hat 10' 
(I) liMe shan bBvo no duty to fn<ltlm.nft'y, r;loCqnd. Ot hold bIJm1Je$~.ruMA.R for and 
~ any IIDd all bsue. and mattol'$lIur.rt;lUndlns tbe cplle~tlon and cmtbn.:'rnent !:lfllnyjudgmonts 
eJJtorcd ftsatnlllRlMARfn the ONDERLYJNG A.CTION; and 
(U) BMC WJJ h~vo no 91lty to in4cmmify. dofrmd or bold hmml~s lUMAR tor 
IPld ftom any Md all ohUms whicb eQuid hay, b\!en prouBht~ bur were no!. by DONNBLL Y 
aaNnIt lUMAR fn tho VNl'lOO" YING ACTION, mcJydlng bltt n~ lin:nted to lhuJeJtl}ent transfer 
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(b) 3JiRulgted J)ismissgl ofCounterc/aims til Dec/aratonl A¢t/Q1!. R1lv1AR hereby agrees 
and stipulates to the dismissal. with prejudic~. of any and all conntc},claims} whether known or 
unla1own •. and ~betlJet.aneged· ontot •. tlJ~rit has or mi~t have Bgajust ;eMC1n the 
DECLARATORY ACTION. RIMA.R 811a11 furthel'cxecute, or cause to be e~ee\It~d, such 
additional documents' and pleadings necessalY to effectUa.te the foregoing. tncluding but not. 
limited to exeoution of a pleading dismissing;its counterclaims alleged against EMC in the 
DECLARATORY ACTION. 
(c) 1telease ofLiabiljly h¥.fU~. RlMAR forever relel;l~es and discharges EMC tor and 
.!i'om any and aU actions. c::auses of actio~j; gnevau~s, claims 'or demands for damages~.jncluding; 
but .not limited to,;attQmey fe'e$', court costs, and litigation ~xpcnses~ a.risin~ out of or which 
could have arisen out of ~ 
.(i) the UNDERLYING ACTION and the $}lbJe~t matter h1Volved. therein; and 
(if) the DECLARATORY.ACTION and the subject matter involved therein; and 
(iii) liMe's handling. pl"ocess,il)& investigation, treatment and disposition ofthlt . ' , 
.::insuran~~ claims .!lod demands made, (if-wluch could have been made. by RlMAR and/or 
DONNELLY in relation to an~Dg r~latcd, In whole or in pari, to the UNDERL YINO ACTlON 
or its subject matter. 
(d) No ConIes, idDeclamtqryllctiolJ. With respect'to the DECLARATORY ACTION, 
.RIMAR shall no lon&~~ /:pntest the same, RIM'AR shall n~t opp.,ose in any way EMC's efforl~ to' 
obtain ajudgment therein favorable ttl EMC.,RJMAR shall adlllit.the anega~9Ds made in.th~ 
DBCLARA TORY ACTION by BMC, and RlMAR ~bal1 confess to entt:y of judgment against 
RIMAR in the DBCLARATpRY AC11;ON. pi'ovided howeller that EMC and RIM'AR shal1 each 




pc obligated'to satisfy tileir O!\,D attorney fees and 'Court costs incurred in the DECLARATORY 
'./I.CnON and £MC shall take 110 I!ffort to receive ~ judgment for atlDmey fees and 'CQurt costs as' 
against RIMAR in the P~LARATORY ACTION; RIMAR shall further e~ecutef I?T cause to be 
executed;. such additional' documents, and plepdinga l'iec~ary to effectuate the foregoing. 
;2. RepresentatioDs., The parties'~ch represent that: 
(a) at the time of execution of tbis Agreement, th~'j:laI1y freely and'voluntarily assented 10 
beillg bound by the terms' and conditions of this Agreement; 
(b),at the time of execution o.(this Agreement and during all times related to the 
n~gotiation and drafting of this Agreement. ihepartybad cap~cit)' to ~C!t and was knowle~geable 
and aware of the deaJin.ss and,effeot ofthis Agreement; 
(0) fhisAgreemends not beill~ex.~ute~ for, an iJlega} purpose arid the terms atld' 
con9.iLiol"!~ ofthis a~eement do not contain any illegal subject matter; 
'Ed), the P!U11. at the time of exetlltio!1'-of Ulis Agreement and during all 'times l"yJated to the 
negotiation and ~rafting of this Agreement, made no misrepres(,nlations. false assertions of facts, 
and did Ilot conceal any facls; 
(e) 'at th'e time of execution of this Agreement and dwing ilU limes, related to the 
negotiation ana:drafting of.this Agreement, the partywas.acting voluntarily and not subject to 
duress or coercion; 
(f) ihe party is unaware of l;iny mu\.Ual or unilateral mistakes related to the fomtation or 
execution of this Agreement; 
(g) the party bas read and understands the tenll~ flnd con4i.~ions olibis Agreement and 
believes all ofthenl'1o b'e fair a!l4 .r~onable; 
Page ~~SErrLElv(ENT AGREEMENT 
(b) 1b~ P.1U1y reaelved udoquatq comldelrati(\l1 In ~~pport of cxCl)ution of thhl' Agreement. 
'fllosa reprO!lontations $ball SlIrvlvtl the ex,oution Ot'tbJ3 AgreQment lWl continue I.llltll tl,o t~s 
and ~oJlditionf I1f this AgfOell1ent bftvc been .t\llfUled by cmoh party. 
3. A§afs.!!lnau1.Ql BlelWf !e.~J!IJ!lt':ti!!l.Or D.u~ NQ party to tb!a AgreGment mftY ~Iri"f~n 
any ri&11tS oftbllt party under .tbIS" Agreement Wlthout tbe exprCliIl written gQDSent or ~Jl plu11es to 
thiB I\greem.ant and MY purpQlfed .fi8s1gnmem n.~t o9IDp.llrJng wI," tJtia seotion Bball bQ 
oonlli~cwed invalld and of no ~ffoot; NQ party to this Agrooment ll'laydelegatctMY d"'ti,~ ()fthllt 
p~ under thls A.veemcnt witllollt the empfess w.rft~n QQn~e.nt orall pm'!:il)~ to lhlll' Agr<'llSl1'Ieni 
an.d any. purported delcglltfolll1ot oomplying with this s~otion shall bo considered mvtlld and of 
no o.ft'eot. 
4. ~l!vtGI!,Qd Inub.: Bach of the parties.to t~ Agreemont agfoD to PCl'form mld ~oout~ 
this ~rnQnf in ICCQrdtmQe ~th the highost Stan~'da ot load. f1:l1tl\ bO{le~ In fbtlt. and ~r 
d~ling, 
S. ~.QQ"tt1lpftq.·In the event that '")' word,. torm. or langu~~e contalnod. In OJ' lnoorporn~ed w; 
tllil ConU'flot shilll be neo~sa.rr to r~olvt; an ambiguity or 'I' dl~emont betwoen tbe pWfieli, 
lb, wor-d, torm, or language lihall bo constru,(l or intorp~tod acootdlng to .Us plft'n meaning 
within tho oontoxt in whicb it is us~, jo U$cerlftln plam moaning, W@8tel'l 'J'hlrti New 
lMqJ'11aliollq.f D.lctiQnrP,)! may lie ClOllliuUed, td th.e ~xolu&ion. of aU Qtber stmldant<llctionarl08. If 
pl,dn meaning dollS not teliolvil tbll·ambiplty Qr'di~llIJ1'eOmontl th(S W01'd. tIJmlt Of langullg~ sball 
be oQMtrued·afmply ano fairly and not tbr. or aStdnst eftb~r of tho pmi" blA'(lto bOQR\lSO tbat 
pm), Of that party'li lopt rGPr~Cl~tiv~ ~ft,d tno Copmwt;. 
6 •. tltfgaUq",. In!b(S evcmt of'a dlspUfO 01' dls~e"moJ1t resarding pet'f.ormenoo, eXOcuuQU, 
Page 5 r SE11'LEMIWf ~(]MSM8Nr 
.. 
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int@t'P,roi3tion, or any athol' matte!: roiat!!4 to lha,fom1llUon Qr titlflJ1ment of'tbls Agr(jem~nt: 
CaY alI. r(.W· 'Tbe laws otthe Stefl! ofldahO a1ul1l $Qvem ~t maUers,l'OIated ~ 8J1O.1l; 
(b) C!m.i£l.JJf.&,1'JJJ!.~. 'l'h~ Dfmnct Court oftb~ P.imt Judicial, ~JBh'lot ottbc State, of 
ldah~ fA and for the County QfSOlW'l', shall navo cxo1usfvo jurlldiotJ.on fQ hoar amd .resolve 
(0) P,nsltJUe.t4fJ:JElligJjg}J. Efton of1hO,J)Brtie$:to tble Apmenf "xpr~Qly (IDn~'nte to 
pcrsoJ.1al,Jl11isdioCfon II11d venue In lho.,Dfatrlct Court of the }t~~ Ju(Uoiall)Jsirl~, of the Stat!! at 
ldah4'. in MQ tor the COllDty O.f!01U1W, and wAives any objeotion to porSCJnll.) ju.l'JsdiQUoll or 
vanuo. tbl\t the purty might bftvt: 
Cd) dtf.€lJ:!lJ!t! :f'GS..DJJ!l.Cow:J..,C"s!A; It any party $et)ks tho servloes 'Of an nttomcy 
rc.igarding surib, the prevaUins pm'ty upon trll'l, ap'peat, or other ,Ndlohil Qj8PQsh[on stll~JI bo 
entitlod to reilDbl.Jl1l8ment of 011 l'etlIonablo attorno), fees, e~urt QQm, II1d lltlption OltpelVetl 
Jnounoed In ento~jn& tbi& Aareemont ~<f in ooUeoting on any Judsmoot ~llfng1hcrcft'om" 
exoClpl SUQh (eos, 008Ui, IJlQ expOUSOII inatUTed itt IHlrM\1S' an Jnv"Ud or unonfproeabloPfQvis.lon 
7. ,MJ!c81lant\QUS. 
(a) /;Rl(1JJIlP.IJrJ.& This ~~t may be oxool.Jtod In s"YOml OQubtorprtl'ts. ollQlrof 
whiClt ~hall bo deomcd IU'J Qrisin{tt, but aU of WbJob ta!c,n tOgotfllr shall OOnftt{ttUo one 1119 tho 
(O)~ If qny 1mn or provbliQn of1hl~ Aai'Oemetlt 01'tbo f.lPplicatiM ()fit to MY 
pC'mon or oiroumlltanco sholl to any exf~nt bGi iuvalid or un<mforoellbJ" the remllind.er of1JU:a. 






thoso to Which it rs J1eld inv/tlld or-um'ldorooabJe shall not ba atreotad thmby, IU'ld eMb term Pf! 
p1'Ovlsion of this. AsrolJment SbAll b, va.Jid Jll1d enfof'OOftbJo to lh' ~l09t egtent pClrmltted by lew 
and tn cguity. 
(e) ~nEa. AI tn, oonttsxt may require III thl~ AgJWm.ont, the use- Qfany pndw· 
.(ma/o, femal4t or ""dor) I1lusll includl the other gOl1dw, Md the ,ingulBJ' sb811 inoludl tb pluml 
lind fpc plural the &mgul8.l'. 
(d) BiJliP1fl.I;(Ij;.o£. TJds AgremlQllt shall bo hlndlngupon ~ oporato to lho benefit Qf all 
pmfles to this Agreement and their respectlvljlneirs, SI.JOO~ors; legal AAU pel'$ollftl 
roproscm~riv .. and pcmnitted Ufigns. 
(0) c'ePil()!&· Tho oapf{Qns beadinS tJll) seotiOTli ofth1a Asroomelit Jttc i1i3mGd COl! 
OOtlv<mj~riQe·of retbronoo only. And bl ItQ way d(lt1no;Umit, QOn¥tru. or 9-esOribi tlle SQope or 
intent of any te.nnll. provIlIlan, or seotkln 'of thls ASI'QOm~llt, 
(1) ~61!t1e.ne.e, Tlmo ~B oftho OVSeQCo in tQiJ Asr;esTIeIlt In i'U PftrtfQulJU'S. All 
Um(lS ""rerr041'0 OJ' dcscdbc:d ~n this Agreemont 6l1aU hminaftor a~ply to the mmsaotion unJeq. 
~U.b'lql,1.cnt to th, date oftWS AgreomClnt, the pPrUes fXpmsly agrell othcrw,isa In wriUng. Th" 
term "d~" melms calendar daya unl08i ther tmn.''busJntnR dnys" is u$Od. 
(~4dJ!1st, Rcc.OUIJI§.l; Jiach ot'tb. partieIllioimowledge fbat they havo hlni tho. 
opporuu1fty to Q()l\lIlllt with tb~lr reapcct(vfillttSI'l Qotlosel·pl'for to lind ~S1rdjJ!B the f()m'Ja~cm. 
t;lX~lIifon, anq POl'fQmlanoCl ofthfll Asrc~mcmt, 
(h) ~ Tha tiilWO·Qfoftner oftM. partlos to tJlilli AsroeJl1Mt f~ insist em thD Iitrlct 
pcrfQm.1anQC' of any oltbo p~vjBrQi1j oftlUs AiNom(lnt shaJbot bel oomtrued rUI4'. waiver Qf AllY. 
eubsequcmt de.&ult ot'thl' some or £;)'mIlIII' natufof not' sball it afteot f40 panie,l rlgbtIJ ta olrum 
Pag~ 'I. S.m'LBMliNT AGREBI!JlNT 
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ml~t porf'QmnmOO O!IUlY Qiher porilQnB of this Asrefmeat. 
8. ~fjdclJdtll.U:. AU otflla parties tq-tbii A8I'etrllsnt lJg'rea that the tmns cm~ pondftil)lUI of 
tbfs Agrmnent and tbQ disposItion, t~ohttloDt and othor mattf" relJltorJ to tultjlUng -the ~ 
anti conditions Of thl, Aareem,nt-Bhl1n tcma~ CONFlD!NTl'AL bttwccm ~lO J)IA'tiM, aAd.IihftU 
not be dfsolose<t to IlSyono CI~COP' to tho extMt iha.tohbcr P.IUW iii I!'sally oqUptod (1 dlsq.lQ8o. or 
to tho I$tent ibnt any party is ,fCQulfecl to dl~g1o.se to tWflU the l'fffis Md C9nlii1lonB .otlbls 
Agroemont, The pilrtie. mtL)'cilscloH tb, terms and oOltaitfona otmill ApmOl1t to II1J,1QU80 01' 
~rofmlQJlIl1 a4vlsofl provldl'Hl suoh pemon ~ to-bo bound bytbJs provision aM tbat any 
QnJaoll oftflli provision by that persoll shall ,,~ tJ broaoh Ul'tder thfa Aarem~t}>), the p~y the 
pel'son represoms. The pm'8os 311311 safogv.m1 aU QOllfiqentinl inJoJ1.J1fttton in suoh manner as to 
f,Jamfltee aplnst ita Inac]yment or neslls.cmt dls"lo~um. Thia A~\!m"DJ may be \.lSod aa 
cvid~Oc In 1m)' subaequant l,roceedil'lS in which IInY ofUtoJ)artfes to 1Iila Asreomont allege, A 













9. MERGED,. TH18lNS'l'AUMBNT CONTAINS THE J1lNALAND OONCLOSlYB 
.AG~ BBTWON THBPAAmS PBR.TAtNlN~rTO TI~ B.USmc.r MAT1l!R. 
DESCRlSBD IN 11', AND.SUPJ3RS!DIS AtLPlU9RAND CONT!MP~US 
AaRBBMBNTs, PROMISBS, lU3P1\!SBNTA1'lQNS.AND UNDJRSTANOlNGS, oRAL ·On. 
W!UTTaN. NO ~O~lPlCATIONS ORAMiNDMl!NTS OF mts AOREiliMliNT·SRAt,t BB 
illNDlN('ft1.NtBSS MOUCl!b.l'O \ValTINO ANJ) SIONIO BY m PARTY SOtTOHT TO 
iBBOtlNt>. 
JIlXJliCOTJi:D by tho ,partieS or tholr duly a\lthoJ'l~ed l'C!pre.scmtaUvos, to bo etThativo as 
p/'QvLd(Jd abovo. 
C~ ~ fr-U 
'''' i.' , .... e , 
10/11 
RINGERT ClARK 
STAn 011 L(;}/I-t;;~ ) 




oAALA G. FRflE 
~P.ubHc 
Stal8of~ho 
IV I? •• I'll 
... - ---.' - _.- ----
WITNESSETH 
On this' da 0 ,lO..Q.;L, ~,etQrenw.~n:ottll'YpUblil',dbl'the 
State of' POJ'fiQ ly'IlPP~OT~ beforo me Employers Mu'tllal ~ualty CPJx!PlUlY. 
by and tliioush its .'bove.iaehtified asen~f wbo is (or 8l'8)pmonaUy kbown to llle fo be ~(I person(s) 
lIo-~ed. ot:'PfOVen. to me Qn Jhe bll.81, ofs~tia~Q~ evidence to be tJw p"r~n(s) 410 D$llleA, whose 
nftlTle{s) is (or 1IJ'e) subv01l'bed to thewlthin Instrument. iU\Q aolmowledse<l tQ me th«thelSM (or tIley) 
."eQl1tol;i th~ 'IImQ, ' 




RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
MICHAEL E. RAMSDEN' 
MAIlC A. LYONS' 
DOUCLAS S. MARFICE' 
MICHAEL A. EALY' 
TERRANCE R. HARRIS' 
APRIL M. LINSCOTT 
RUDY 1. VERSCHOOR 
. 1 ENNIFER L. DAHLSTROM" 
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT 
VIRGINIA McNULTY ROBINSON 
THERON 1. DE SMET 
WILLIAM F. BOYD, OF COUNSEL 
Bonner County Sheriff 
Civil Section 
4001 N_ Boyer Road 
Sandpoint, Idaho, 83864 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1336 
COEUR D'ALENE, 10 B3B16-1336 
TELEPHONE: (20B) 664-5818 
FACSIMILE: (208) 664-5884 
E-MAIL: flrm@lramsdenlyons.com 
WEBSITE: www.ramsdenlyons.com 
November 10, 2009 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SHERIFF 
Re: Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc. 
Bonner County Case No. CV-06-0044S 
Name of Defendants to be executed against: Rimar Construction, Inc. 
Defendants Social Security# and/or date of birth: N/A 
Mailing address of Defendant: 
Rimar Construction, Inc. 
11707 Culvers Drive 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Employer of Defendant including their address and phone number: N/A 
Bank(s) to be s~rved and their address: 
1. Mountain West Bank 
201 E Superior Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
STREET ADDRESS: 
700 NORTHWEST BLVD. 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814 
ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
• LICENSED IN WASHINCTON 
422 
EXHIBIT C. 
Bonner County Sheriff 
November 10, 2Q09 
Page 2 
2. Bank of America 
405 N. 2nd Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
3. Panhandle State Bank 
414 Church Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
VehicIe(s) to be picked up and their vehicle inquiry forms: None identified to date. 
Misc. personal property (including description, serial#'s and location: 
1. Notice and attachment of all right and interest in judgment debtor's claims to 
insurance benefits and/or monies from' Employers Mutual Casualty Company 
Commercial General Liability policy number 2D1-32-95-05 dated October 1, 2004 
through October 1, 2005 and policy number 2D1-32-95-06 dated 'October 1, 2005 
through October 1, 2006. 
2. Notice and attachment of all right and interest in judgment debtor's' causes of 
action and/or counterclaim(s) as set forth in Bonner County CV-2007-00885. 
3. Notice and attachment of any and all right and interest in judgment debtor's 
contraf:tual right or claim to proceeds and/or monies from its contract to construct 
buildings five and six at the Seasons at Sandpoint Condominiums located at or about 
313 N. 1st Avenue, Sandpoint, Idaho. 
4. Notice and attachment of any and all of judgment debtor's accounts 
receivable(s) and/or right and interest in judgment debtor's contractual right or claim 
to proceeds and/or monies earned from any contracts upon which it is owed or due 
monies. 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE 
Request garnish wages at place of employment: No 
Request garnishment of Bank Account: Yes 
Request levy on personal property listed: No 
Additional information (D#"ections, etc.): As of November 10, 2009, the total judgment 
owed by the judgment debtor inclusive of interest is $449,625.66. Judgment creditor 
seeks levy and attachment on any and all real and/or personal property of the judgment 
debtor found in satisfaction of the judgment. Attached hereto is a true and correct copy 
of the Judgment on Special Verdict with Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs and· Defendant 
423 
Bonner County Sheriff 
November 10, 2009 
Page 3 
Rimar Construction, Inc., dated August 14, 2008, and Amended Judgment on Special 
Verdict with Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc., 
dated March 20, 2009, and recorded March 30, 2009, Instrument #769177. Also 
attached is a copy of the Idaho Secretary of State business entity information sheet for 
Rimar Construction, Inc. 
Dated this /6 
---Tr 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF-THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIlE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DAVID DONNELLY and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
DefendantiCounterclaimant. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Case No. CV-06-00445 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 
TO THE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
GREETINGS: 
WHEREAS on the 20th day of March, 2009, plaintiff recovered an initial Judgment on 
Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. in 
the initial amount of $128,611.55 plus interest at the legal rate (7.625%) as entered on August, 
14, 2008, and fmal Amended Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of ~~aintiffs 
and Defendant Rimar Construction Inc. in the amended amount of $425,545.44 to accrue 
WRIT OF EXECUTION - 1 EXHIBIT 0 
) 
interest at the legal rate (7.625% to July 1, 2009 and 5.625% after July 1, 2009) as ent~red 011 
March 20, 2009 in. the District Court of the State of Jdaho, County of Bonner, against the 
defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc., for the total sum of$449,625.66, plus interest accrued at the 
legal rate from entry of the initial judgment on August 14,2008 up and until November 10, 2009 
as follows: 
Judgment Amount $128,611.55 $431,402.55 $440,594.97 
Interest on 
Judgment 0.07625 0.07625 0.05625 
InterestlYr $9,806.63 $32,894.44 $24,783.47 
OayslYr 365 365 365 
Per Day Rate $26.87 $90.12 $67.90 
Days 218 102 133 
$24,080.2 
Total Interest $5,857.11 $9,192.42 $9,030.69 2 
Total with Interest ~1341468.66 $440,594.97 $449,625.66 
Fees and Costs $296,933.89 
Total March 20, 
2009 $431,402.55 
Note: Rate of Interest on Money Judgments was 7.625% effective July 1,2008 
Rate of Interest on Money Judgments was 5.625% effective July 1, 2009 
AND, WHEREAS, that final Amended Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to 
Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction Inc. was duly filed in the Clerk's office 
of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Bonner, on March 20, 2099 and that Judgment' was duly recorded as a judgment lien with the 
Bonner County Recorder on March 30, 2009; 
NOW, you, the Sheriff of Bonner County, are hereby required to satisfy said Judgment, 
with the accrued interest as aforesaid, out of the personal property of the defendant Rimar 
Construction, Inc., the judgment debtor, or if sufficient property of said debtor cannot be found, 
then out of the real property in Bonner County belonging to said judgment debtor on the date of 
WRlT OF EXECUTION - 2 
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service of this writ, and make return of this writ within sixty (60) days after the receipt,hereof, 
with what you have done endorsed thereon. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal tillS JQ d~y of (\/ o()em be/) 009 . 
Marie Scott, Clerk 
B 
WRIT OF EXECUTION - 3 427 
--- .. v .. " ... nnvL. l'IMrHI;;) rax: I <!Ul:l<!o::J0759 Nov 24 2009 15:04 P.02 




BRUCE A • .AND~ON* 
DOPCLAS:a ~­
CINDY:ELLIOrr 
JAMES S. MACDONALD 
-ALSO LlCENSISO IN COl.OMDO 
'-AlSO l.IC1lNSiD IN WASHlNGTOt\ 
ATI'ORNEYS - AT - LAW 
102 SOUTH EUCLID AVENUE, SUITE 307 
P. O. :BOX 1049 
SANDPOINT, IDAHO 83864-0855 
TELEPHONE (208) 263-8517 
:FACSlMILE (208) 263-6759 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Bonner County Sheriff 
At1n: Chief Civil Deputy 
4001 North 'Boyer 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
cc: Larry Goins, Bonner County Prosecutor's Office 
Mike Ealy, Esq., Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
From: Ford Elsaesser 
Date: November 24, 2009 
Re: First District Court of Idaho for Bonner County 
Case No: CV-06-00445 









DONNA LaRUE, CLA 
J'AAAlZOAL 
LOIS La POINn, RJ> 
LEGAL ASS1S7 ANT TO PORl).EI.S.A.I!SSD. 
Reference is made to a WRIT OF EXECUTION issued on November 10, 2009, )Vith 
regard to the above-entitled matter. 
Please be advised that,R1MAR CONStRUCTION. INC. owns nO,property. real or 
personal. Further, RlMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC. owns no equipment, heavy 
equipment, titled or untitled motor vehicles, tools, receivables, inventory, or any other 
personal property of any description. The only property owned by RIM:AR 
CONSTRUCTION, INC. was a bank account which was used to pay some tailing phone 
bi1~ after the company sh:ut down. Those funds have already been garnished by your 
office for the benefit of the judgment creditor. 
I wanted to advise the Sherifi's Department of these facts so that any further action that is 
taken, or not taken, will be with the full Jmowlodge of these circummlBIT ~ 
'i 2 8 
LLv~ v~KL ~NUt MAHK~ Fax:12082630759 
Bonner County Sheriff, Chief Civil Deputy 
November 24; 2009 
Page 2 
Nov 24 2009 15:04 P.03 
Please contact me if you have any questions of any kind. Please note that this judgment 
has no effect or impact onoN AN RIMAR, personally, or on any other company with 
which he is assoCiated. 
Thank you. 
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State of IDAHO 
Bonner County SheriffJs Office 
Civil Division 
4001 N. Boyer Ave. 
Sandpoint J ID 83864 
Defendant Disposition: 
Rimar Construction 
1707 Culvers Dr; PO Box 6 SandpointJ ID 83864 
Garnishee Disposition: SRU ServedJ returned unsatisfied 
Mountain West Bank 
201 E Superior St SandpointJ ID 83864 
Served on: 13th day'of November J 2009 
Served to: Cassidie Spinney 
201 E Superior St 
Bank of America 
by Peasha J J 
Manager 
SandpointJ ID 83864 
402 N 2nd Ave SandpointJ ID 83864 
Served on: 13th day of November, 2009 by Peasha, J 
Served to: Lynn Jennings Assistant Manager 
402 N 2nd Ave Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Panhandle State Bank 
414 Church St Sandpoint, 1D 83864 
Served on: 13th day of November, 2009 by Peasha, J 
Served to: Kelly Glenn 
414 Church St Sandpoint, ID 
Plaintiff Disposition: 
David Michael Donnelly 
3662 Cocolalla Loop Road Cocolalla, ID 83813 
Attorney Disposition: 
Michael A Ealy Atty 
PO Box 1336 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Manager 
83864 
Process Number: C09-01949 Court Number: CV06-445 
IJ Daryl D Wheeler, Sheriff of Bonner County SheriffJs Office do hereby certify 
that I received the foregoing Writ of Execution on the 12th day of November, 
2009. 















Jul. 14, 2010 4:30PM 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeut' d' Alene, ID 83816~ 1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. EaJy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attomeys for Defendants Donnelly 
No. 8394 P. 3/6 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE Fm.ST nmICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY. an Iowa Corporation) 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
DEFEENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME AND 
CONTINUANCE OF HEARING 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and tIu'ough their counsel of 
record, and objects to the Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time and Continuance of Heating 
on the following grounds: 
I. The Donnellys are prejudiced by the Plaintiff's Motion To Continue. The COUlt 
can take notice of the record herein and record in the Underlying Litigation in Donnelly v. Rimar 
COllstnlctl0n. Inc. et al.. Bonner County CV-06-0044S and recognize that the Donnellys have 
been involved in this instant litigation since its inception in 2007 and the Underlying Litigation 
DEFENDANT'S OBJBCTrON TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF T{ME AND CONTrNUANCE 
OF' HEARING - 1 
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since 2006. Having prevailed in the Underlying Litigation and obtained a substantial judgment 
($425,545.44) against RimaI' Constmction, Inc. ("RCI"») the Donnellys are judgment creditors of 
RCI, whose recorded judgment remains Wlsatisfied. To date, EMC, bas vigorously contested 
any duty to pay the Donnelly judgment on behalf of its insured, ReI and) to date, has never made 
any payment to Donnelly in an effOJ1 to satisfy their judgment, in whole 01' in part, thus forcing 
dle DOlmellys to continue to expend time and resources toward the satisfaction of their judgment 
through this action. Further delay prejudices the Donnellys' effol1S to prosecute and defend this 
action and impedes their on-going efforts to satisfy their judgment. 
2. EMC is represented by Imlltiple attome~. EMC is represented by both Mr. Reid 
and Mr. Claiborne of the firm Ringen Law Chaltered, It is the DOlUlellys' position that since 
EMC has two attorneys working on this matter, the Plaintiffs have not and caMot demonstrate 
good cause as to why EMC cannot tinlely respond to the Donnellys' pending Motion to 
Reconsider, 
3. fMC is not prejudiced by the Donnellys' Motion to Reconsider. It is the 
Donnellys' position that £Me has not shown ally particular prejudice caused by the Donnellys' 
motion and has failed to demonstrate good cause for continuing that motion into the fitnll'e for 
the sole convenience of EMC and to the noted prejudice of the DonneJIys. The DOIU1ellys' 
pending Motion to Reconsider doesn't prejudice or otherwise prevent EMC fl.·om pursuing its 
own motion at a later date should it decide to pursue one. 
4. The DonneUys want their motion heard. The DonneUys want this litigation to 
reach resolution whether by motion practice or trial. Their pending Motion to Reconsidel' seeks 
to do that. The Donnellys do not want to have to endure any further or tllmecessalY delay in 
DBFBNDANT'S OBmCTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR BXTENSION OF TIME AND CONTINUANCE 
OF HEARING - 2 
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moving this matter toward resolution. While a business entity, like EMC, may have a different 
perception of this action and timing of litigation matters, to individuals like Dave and Kathy 
DOIUlelly, this litigation (and the Underlying Litigation) has taken years and the expenditure of 
considerable reSOlU'Ces and, therefol'e~ EMC's motion to continue is perceived as one that is 
intended to cause them filrther delay and expense to their detriment and prejudice. 
Therefore, the DonneJlys would ask: the Court to deny the Plaintiff's Motion to Continue 
and leave its pending Motion to Reconsider noted for hearing as scheduled. 
Oral argument is requested on EMC's Motion to Continue. 
DATED lhisL${ day of July. 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECfION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND CONTINUANCE 
OF HEAR.ING - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1);[ day of July. 2010, I served a nue and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated belowj and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid 
David p, Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chattered 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, 10 83701-2773 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
PhiJIabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Brent C, Featherston 
Featherston Law Finn 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint. ID 83864 
US Mail 
__ Ovemight Mail 
_Ijand Delivered 




_V_FFaa~csimlle (509) 625-1909 
US Mail 
_ Ovemight Mail 
_ HJRd Delivered 
~acsimile (208) 263-0400 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND CONTINUANCE 
OF H£ARlNG - 4 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
STATE OF 1,1.'; I 
COUNTY OF BONNr:p 
FIRST JUDICIAL DIS T. 
za/O JUl I 5 P 3: 3 3 
,'" ",',;j'-" . .... -\ .. ., .... ~\..IU; t 
CLERK DIS RICT COur; i 
DE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
DONNELLY'S MOTION TO 
AMEND ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
This matter having come before the Court on the Defendants' Dave and Kathy Donnelly's 
Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim, and the Court having considered the pleadings filed 
both in support and opposition thereto, and having considered the oral arguments of the paliies 
both in support and opposition thereto, and having considered the record on file herein, and for 
those reasons stated on the record in open court; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Donnelly's Motion to Amend Answer and 
Counterclaim is hereby GRANTED and the Donnelly's are granted leave to file their Second 
Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Claim as proposed. 
DATED thiS~ of ,2010, 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - I 
435 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1& day of J'A l~ , 2010, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, d addressed to the folloWIng: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Michael A. Ealy 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
~USMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 342-4657 
LUSMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 664-5884 
1USMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (509) 625-1909 
)( US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 263-0400 
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STATE OF iDf\U) 
COUNTY OF BmHlEf~ 
FIRST JUDICIAL OIST. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY ) 






RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; and DAVID and ) 




Case No. CV-2007-0000885 
ORDER ON MOTION TO CONTINUE 
The court has before it a motion to continue David and Kathy Donnellys' motion for 
reconsideration and an objection to that motion. The motion for reconsideration is presently 
scheduled for hearing on July 21,2010. 
The Donnellys' objection to continuing the hearing is based on the underlying supposition 
that the court will reconsider and then conclude that the previous order denying summary judgment 
will be withdrawn and that summary judgment will be granted in the Donnellys' favor. The 
Donnellys' main objection is that further delay is prejudicial to them. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO CONTINUE- 1. 
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On July 7,2010, the court granted the Donnellys' motion to amend its pleadings to allege 
additional causes of action. The new allegations resulted in a delay due to the fact that the opposing 
parties were entitled to have adequate time to conduct discovery and file pretrial motions in regard to 
the new causes of action. Now that a trial is scheduled to begin on April 25, 2011, it appears to be 
prudent to have the motion to reconsider fully briefed by all parties before oral argument occurs. 
NOW THEREFORE, recognizing that a motion to continue is addressed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, for the reason that additional briefing is desirable and for the reason that 
a continuance will allow the court time to conduct further research on the issues raised, 
IT IS ORDERED that Employers Mutual Casualty Company's motion to continue the hearing 
on the motion for reconsideration is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Donnellys' motion to reconsider shall be heard at 10:00 
a.m., on September 8,2010. 
'b# DATED this / day of July, 2010. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was faxed, this.Lk day of July, 
2010, to: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
Faxed 208-342-4657 
Michael A. Ealy Faxed 208-664-5884 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
Stephen D. Phillabaum Faxed 509-625-1909 
Phillabaum Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
Brent C. Featherston Faxed 208-263-0400 
Featherston Law Finn 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER ON MOTION TO CONTINUE- 3. 
439 
JAMES G. REID, ISB # 1372 
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE, ISB # 6579 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 South Third Street 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-mail: dpc@ringertlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
cC.:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife; and IVAN 
RIMAR, an individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2007-00885 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO SECOND 
AMENDED ANSWER, 
COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS CLAIM 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, by and through its 
attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and hereby answers, responds and replies to Defendant 
David and Kathy Donnelly's Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Claim (herein "the 
Counterclaim"), filed on or about July 13,2010, as follows: 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS 




The Counterclaim sets forth both counterclaims directed at Plaintiff and cross claims directed 
at Defendants Rimar Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar. This Reply addresses only those allegations 
made as a counterclaim as against Plaintiff. To the extent any of the allegations of the cross claim 
are directed to Plaintiff, those allegations are denied. 
RULE 12 DEFENSES 
2 
The Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and therefore ought 
to be dismissed with prejudice. 
GENERAL DENIALS 
3 
Plaintiff denies each and every allegation and averment contained in the Counterclaim unless 
expressly admitted herein. 
4 
Paragraphs 1 through 14 of the Counterclaim set forth certain denials, defenses and 
affirmative defenses to which no response is required, but to the extent response is required, then 
those paragraphs are denied. 
5 
Plaintiff admits paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,20,21,23,28,35 and 41 of the Counterclaim. 
6 
With respect to paragraph 22 of the Counterclaim, Plaintiff admits it knew and recognized 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS 
CLAIM -2 
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the Donnellys as potential claimants against RCI's commercial general liability policy, but the 
remainder of the allegations of paragraph 22 of the Counterclaim are denied. 
7 
With respect to paragraph 25 of the Counterclaim, Plaintiff admits the Donnellys are persons 
interested under the EMC COL Policy whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by 
the Policy and that the Donnellys are entitled to a declaration of their rights, status or other legal 
relations under the policy, but the remainder of the allegations of paragraph 25 of the Counterclaim 
are denied. 
8 
With respect to paragraph 26 of the Counterclaim, Plaintiff admits that it has not made any 
payments to Donnelly or the Court in effort to satisfy the Donnelly judgment, but the remainder of 
the allegations of paragraph 26 of the Counterclaim are denied. 
9 
With respect to paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 of the Counterclaim, the allegations contained 
thereat contain and set forth legal conclusions and argument to which no response is required, but 
to the extent response is required then Plaintiff denies the allegations set forth at paragraphs 29, 30 
and 31 of the Counterclaim. 
10 
With respect to paragraph 34 of the Counterclaim, Plaintiff admits EMC and RCI entered into 
a Settlement Agreement dated August 17,2009, a true and correct copy of which is attached to the 
Counterclaim as Exhibit B, the contents of which speak for itself, but the remainder of the 
allegations of paragraph 34 of the Counterclaim are denied. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS 
CLAIM - 3 
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11 
Plaintifflacks sufficient knowledge so as to form a belief as to the truth of the matters alleged 




Defendants are not entitled to all or part of the relief they seek by way of their 
Counterclaim for the reason that the damages alleged in the Counterclaim reasonably could have 
been avoided by Defendants. 
13 
(Compliance) 
Defendants should be denied all or part of the relief they seek by way of their 
Counterclaim for the reason that Plaintiff complied with all of the contractual requirements 
imposed upon it. 
14 
(Real Party in Interest) 
With respect to all or part of the claims raised in the Counterclaim, Plaintiff is not 
the real party in interest. 
15 
(Failure to Mitigate Damages) 
Defendants should be denied all or part of the relief they seek by way of their 
Counterclaim for the reason that Defendants have failed to mitigate any damages to which 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS 
CLAIM -4 
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Defendants may have been entitled. 
16 
(Exception) 
Defendants should be denied all or part of the relief they seek by way of their 




Defendants should be denied all or part of the relief they seek by way of their 
Counterclaim for the reason that the alleged damage or act was excluded from coverage under 
the applicable policies. 
18 
(Intentional Act) 
Defendants should be denied all or part of the relief they seek by way of their 
Counterclaim for the reason that the injury to Defendants, if any, was caused by the intentional 
acts of Plaintiffs insured, for which no coverage is allowed or for which coverage would be 
against public policy. 
19 
(No Coverage) 
Defendants should be denied all or part of the relief they seek by way of their 
Counterclaim for the reason that the applicable policies do not provide coverage for the alleged 
acts or damage. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS 
CLAIM - 5 
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20 
(Reservation of Additional Affirmative Defenses) 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, all possible affinnative 
defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient facts are not available 
at this time to fonn an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after Plaintiff has made reasonable 
inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore, Plaintiff reserves the right to raise additional affinnative 
defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this matter progresses. 
COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
21 
Pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 12~ 1 0 1, and/or Rule 54( d) of the IDAHO RULES OF CiVIL 
PROCEDURE, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of litigation expenses and court costs incurred 
relative to the defense of this action. 
22 
In order to defend against this action, Plaintiff has retained the attorney services of 
Ringert Law Chartered. 
23 
Pursuant to IDAHO CODE §§ 12-120, 12-121, and/or 41-1839 and/or Rule 54(e) of the 
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of litigation expenses and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred relative to the defense of this action. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff PRAYS that Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly take 
nothing in or by way of the Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Claim, that the 
same be dismissed with prejudice, and that Plaintiff be awarded its court costs, reasonable 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS 
CLAIM - 6 
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litigation expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in defense of the same. 
WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby makes a WAIVER of any and all rights to trial by jury of any facts or 
issues involved in this action. 
RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO AMEND OR ADD CLAIMS 
The foregoing constitutes the present full and complete reply of Plaintiff, but Plaintiff 
hereby reserves the right to seek amendment of the reply, and to possibly assert other claims 
and/or third party claims, as discovery is conducted and further facts are developed relative to the 
matters described and alleged in the Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Claim. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2010. 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
by: ~~~= 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS 
CLAIM -7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the 
following on this 22nd day of July, 2010 by the following method: 
STEPHEN D. PHILLABAUM 
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, ET AL. 
421 West Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, Washington 99201 
Telephone: (509) 838-6055 
Facsimile: (509) 625-1909 
E-Mail: stevep@spokanelaw.com 
Attorneys for Rimar Construction 
MARC A. LYONS 
MICHAEL A. EAL Y 
RAMSDEN LYONS 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
E-Mail: firm@ramsdenlyons.com 
Attorneys for David and Kathy Donnelly 
HONORABLESTEVEVERBY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
215 South 1 sl Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Telephone: (208) 265-1445 
Facsimile: (208) 263-0896 
E-Mail: nla 
Presiding Judge - Courtesy Copy 
lXJ U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 
LJ Electronic Mail 
~ U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
L] Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 
LJ Electronic Mail 
(Xl U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
LJ Hand Deli very 
LJ Facsimile 
LJ Electronic Mail 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
MichaelA. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE 
DEFAULT 
TO: Cross Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. and its attorney of record, Stephen D. 
Phillabaum: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Cross Claimants David and Kathy Donnelly will 
make application to the Court for entry of default and default judgment against Cross Defendants 




NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEFAULT - I 
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DATED this~ day of August, 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
BY~~r-__ ~~ ____ ~ ________ __ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the {Q day of August, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, LedIin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, W A 99201 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEFAULT - 2 
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US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~ Ijamf Delivered 
_~_ Faaccssiimlile (208) 342-4657 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
_ IjaBd1)elivered 















BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 263-0400 (Fax) 
STEPHEN D. PHILLABAUM, ISB NO. 5127 
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, MATTHEWS 
& SHELDON, PLLC 
421 West Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, Washington, 99201 
(509) 838-6055 
(509) 625-1909 (Fax) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 








RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife, 
REPL Y OF RIMAR 
CONSTRUCTION, INC. and IVAN 
RIMAR TO SECOND AMENDED 










COME NOW Defendants IV AN RIMAR and RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
(hereinafter "Defendants"), by and through their attorneys of record, PhiIlabaum, Ledlin, 
Matthews & Sheldon, PLLC, and hereby answer, respond and reply to Defendant David and 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED 
PHILLABAUM. LEDLlN. MAITHEWS 
&. SHELDON. PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
28 ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM - 1 421 W. RJVERSlDE AVE .. SUITE 900 SPOKANE. WASHINGTON 99201.()418 




























Kathy Donnelly's Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Claim (herein "the 
Counterclaim"), filed on or about July 13, 2010, as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
1 
The Counterclaim sets forth both counterclaims directed at Plaintiff and cross claims 
directed at Defendants Rimar Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar. This Reply addresses only 
those allegations made as a counterclaim as against Rimar Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar. 
To the extent any of the allegations of the counterclaim are directed to Defendants Rimar, those 
allegations are denied. 
RULE 12 DEFENSES 
2 
The Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and therefore 
ought to be dismissed with prejudice. 
GENERAL DENIALS 
3 
Defendants deny each and every allegation and averment contained in the Cross Claim 
unless expressly admitted herein. 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED 
PHILLABAUM, LEDUN, MATTHEWS 
& SHELDON. PLLC 
AlTORNEYS AT LAW 
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Paragraphs 1 through 14 of the Cross Claim set forth certain denials, defenses and 
affirmative defenses to which no response is required, but to the extent response is required, then 
those paragraphs are denied. 
5 
Defendants admit paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,20,21,23,28,32,33,35 and 41 of the 
Cross Claim. 
6 
With respect to paragraph 22 of the Cross Claim, Defendants admit EMC defended 
Rimar Construction, Inc. through trial. Defendants are without sufficient information to admit 
deny the remainder of paragraph 22 and therefore deny. 
7 
With respect to paragraph 25 of the Cross Claim, Defendants admit the Donnellys are 
persons interested under the EMC CGL Policy whose rights, status or other legal relations are 
affected by the Policy and that the Donnellys are entitled to a declaration of their rights, status or 
other legal relations under the policy, but the remainder of the allegations of paragraph 25 of the 
Cross Claim are denied. 
8 
With respect to paragraph 26 of the Cross Claim, Defendants admit that they have not 
made any payments to Donnelly or the court in effort to satisfy the Donnelly judgment, but the 
remainder of the allegations of paragraph 26 of the Cross Claim are denied. 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED 
PHllLABAUM,LEDLm, MATTHEWS 
&. SHELDON, PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
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With respect to paragraphs 29,30 and 31 of the Cross Claim, the allegations contained 
thereat contain and set forth legal conclusions and argument to which no response is required, 
but to the extent response is required then Defendants deny the allegations set forth at pargraphs 
29,30 and 31 of the Cross Claim. 
10 
With respect to paragraph 34 of the Cross Claim, Defendants admit EMC and RCI 
entered into a Settlement Agreement dated August 17,2009, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached to the Cross Claim as Exhibit B, the contents of which speak for itself, but the 
remainder of the allegations of paragraph 34 of the Counterclaim are denied. 
11 
Defendants lack sufficient knowledge so as to form a belief as to the truth of the matters 




Any cross claims asserted by the Donnellys in this action are barred by the doctrine of 
res judicia. 
I DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED 
PHILLABAUM. LEDLIN, MAITHEWS 
&. SHELDON, PLLC 
AnORNEYS AT LAW 
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(Reservation of Additional Affirmative Defenses) 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, all possible affirmative 
defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient facts are not available 
at this time to form an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after Defendants have made 
reasonable inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore Defendants reserve the right to raise 
additional affirmative defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this matter progresses. 
COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
14 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-1 01, and/or Rule 54( d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Defendants are entitled to an award of litigation expenses and court costs incurred 
relative to the defense of this action. 
15 
In order to defend against this action, Defendants have retained the attorney services of 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon, PLLS. 
16 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-20, 12-121, and/or 41-1839 and/or Rule 54(e) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants are entitled to an award of litigation expenses and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred relative to the defense of this action. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly take 
nothing in or by way of the Second Amended Answer, counterclaim and Cross Claim, that the 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED 
PHILLABAUM. LEDLIN. MATTHEWS 
'" SHELDON. PLLC 
AITORNEYS AT LAW 
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same be dismissed with prejudice, and that Defenda.'1ts be awarded their court costs, reasonable 
litigation expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in defense of the same. 
WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL 
Defendants hereby make a WAIVER of any and all rights to try by jury of any facts or 
issues involved in this action. 
RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO AMEND OR ADD CLAIMS 
The foregoing constitutes the present full and complete reply of Defendants, but 
Defendants hereby reserve the right to seek amendment of the reply, and to possibly assert other 
claims and/or third party claims, as discovery is conducted and further facts are developed 
relative to the matters described and alleged in the Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and 
Cross Claim. 
DATED August 12, 2010. 
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, MATTHEWS 
& SHELDON, PLLC 
~.:;qI...,1"~..",. 
Stephen D. Phillabaum, ISB #5127 I 
Attorneys for Rimar Construction, Inc. 
and Ivan Rimar 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date, true and correct copies of 
foregoing document were served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
455 South Third Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Michael A. Ealy 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Honorable Steve Verby 
District Judge 
215 South 1 5t Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Presiding Judge - Courtesy Copy 
DATED August 12, 2010. 
Reply to Second Amended Answer Counterclaim CrossClaim.doc 
[Xl U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid 
[] Hand Delivered 
[] Overnight Courier 
[Xl Telecopy (Fax): (208) 342-4657 
[] U.S. Mail 
[] Hand Delivered 
[xl Overnight Courier 
[X] Telecopy (Fax): (208) 664-5884 
[] U.S. Mail, First Class, Postage Prepaid 
[] Hand Delivered 
[Xl Overnight Courier 
[l Telecopy (Fax): 
[l Email 
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& SHELDON, PLLC 
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TELEPHONE (m) 838-6055 
JAMES G. REID, ISB # 1372 
DAVID P. CLAmORNE, ISB # 6579 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 South Third Street 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-mail: dpc@ringertlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife; and IVAN 
RIMAR, an individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2007-00885 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, by and through its 
attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and, PURSUANT TO Rules 11(a)(2) and 56 of the 
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, HEREBY MOVES THE COURT for the reconsideration of 
its Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, entered April 7, 2010. 
Good cause and proper grounds e:xist for entry of the relief requested hereby for the reasons 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1 
set forth in the Memorandum Re: Motions for Reconsideration, which is filed herewith. 
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum Re: Motions for Reconsideration, which is 
filed herewith, as well as by all pleadings, affidavits and other documents on file with the Court 
herein, particularly those submitted relative to prior proceedings concerning summary judgment. 
Oral argument on this Motion is respectfully requested. 
/9tP DATED this __ day of August, 2010. 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
by: /~ P L =::::::::>~.. ~====--==< 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
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458 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. I hereby. ~at a true and correct copy of the f~regoing document was served on the 
followmg on thIS . day of August, 2010 by the followmg method: 
;'0 
STEPHEN D. PHILLABAUM 
PHILLA~AUM, LEDLIN, ET AL. 
421 West Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, Washington 99201 
Telephone: (509) 838-6055 
Facsimile: (509) 625-1909 
E-Mail: stevep@spokanelaw.com 
Attorneys for Rimar Construction 
MARC A. LYONS 
MICHAEL A. EALY 
RAMSDEN LYONS 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
E-Mail: firm@ramsdenlyons.com 
Attorneys for David and Kathy Donnelly 
HONORABLE STEVE VERBY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
215 South 1 51 Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Telephone: (208) 265-1445 
Facsimile: (208) 263-0896 
E-Mail: nla 
Presiding Judge - Courtesy Copy 
[6' U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[-1 U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[_] Federal Express 
[_] Hand Delivery 
[_] Facsimile 
[_] Electronic Mail 
[ ~ U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[-1 U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[_] Federal Express 
[_] Hand Delivery 
[_] Facsimile 
[_] Electronic Mail 
L~S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[_] U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[_] Federal Express 
[_] Hand Deli very 
[_] Facsimile 
[_] Electronic Mail 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attomeys for Defendants Donnelly 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy I?onneJly, by and through their counsel of 
record, and submit this reply memorandum in support of their Motion for Reconsideration and in 
opposition to EMC's Motion for Reconsideration. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The pat1ies' prior cross motions for summary judgment and competing motions to 
reconsider address two issues: (1) how to characterize the jury's damage award in the 
Underlying Litigation for the purposes making a coverage determination; and (2) whether or not 
EMC has a supplementary duty to pay the DonneUys' attorney's .fees and costs and interest on 
the judgment regardless of that characterization. Based on the undisputed factual record and by 
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their motion to reconsider. the Donnellys ask the court to address both of these issues and decide 
them, as a matter of law. 
W. LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
A. THE UNDERLYING JURY VERDICT IS A GENERAL VERDICT WITH 
INTERROGATORIES AND IS UNALLOCATED FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF DETERMINING COVERAGE. 
EMC al'gues that the underlying jUly verdict is a "special verdict" and one that 
allocated lIability and damages. While the underlying jury verdict is labeled as a "Special 
Verdict." pursuant to I,R.C.P, 49(b) and in substance, it is best characterized and recognized 
as a general verdict with interrogatories. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 49 distinguishes and 
describes each as follows: 
(a) Speeial Verdicts and Intel' .. ogatol'ies~-Special Verdicts. The court may 
reguire a· jUly to rettll11 only a special verdict in the form of a specia) Wl'iuen 
finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the court may submit to the jury 
written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or may 
submit written forms of the several special findings which might properly be 
made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method of 
submitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as it deems 
most appropriate, The court shall give to the jury such explanation and 
instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessaty to enable 
the jUly to make its findings upon each issue. , .. 
(b) General Vel'diet Accompanied by Answer to Interr02atories. The court 
may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdicta 
written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is 
neCeSS3IY to a verdict. The CO\U1 shan give such explanation or instruction as 
may be necessaIY to enable the jUl)' both to make answers to the 
intenogatorjes and to render a general verdict. and the court shall direct the 
iw'y both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When the 
general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the coul1 shall direct the entry 
of the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers. 
I.R.C.P. 49 (emphasis added). 
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EMC cited Zhang v. American Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) which 
explains the distinction well under the similar F.R.C.P. 49. In Zhang. the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals explained as follows: 
A jury may return mUltiple general verdicts as to each claim, and each 
party, in a lawsuit without undermining the general nature of its verdicts. (citation 
omitted], Although some general verdicts are more general than others, 
encompassing multiple claims, the key is not the number of questions on the 
verdict fonn, but whether the jUlY announces the ultimate legal result of each 
claim. If the jury announces only its ultimate conclusions, it returns an ordinary 
general verdict; if it makes factual findings in addition to the ultimate legal 
conclusions. it returns a general verdict with intell'Qgatories. If it returns only 
factual findings, leaving the COUlt to detelmine the ultimate legal result, it returns 
a special verdict. 
Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1031 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
As applied to the underlying verdict, the verdict announces the ultimate legal result of 
each claim and makes factual findings by answer to certain interrogatories. Therefore, it is 
properly characterized as a general verdict with interrogatolies. Since it doesn't retum only the 
jury's factual findings leaving the court to detennine the ultimate legal result, it is not a special 
verdict. 
As applied to this case, there is no dispute that the underlying jury verdict appOitioned 
liability to RCI as set forth on the face of the verdict and the court entered judgment accordingly. 
However, because the jury was not asked by special intelmgatory to further itemize or 
characterize its damage award, it remains unknown whether it was the jury's intent to 
compensate the Donnellys for property damage, or economic loss or both. This has left the 
parties to argue how to characterize the jury's damage award for the purposes of detennining 
whether BMC owes a duty to pay those damages. 
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By their motion to reconsider, the Donnellys ask the court to revisit its earlier decision on 
this issue by looking at the Idaho case authority set forth in Buckley v. Orem, 112 Idaho 117, 
730 P.2d 1Q37 (Ct. App. 1986). In Buckley, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that the 
('precise issue is the extent of Nationwide's liability under its insurance contract to pay the 
fmal judgment against the Orems for unapportioned damages." Id. at 119. Similarly, in this 
case, the issue could be stated as: The extent of EMC's liability under its insurance contract 
to pay the final judgment against ReI for unapportioned damages. 
The plain meaning of the word "apportion" is "to divide and assign accordmg to some 
plan or proportion; allot; pal1ition." Am. Hert. Diet., 1979, p. 64. The distinction, if any, in 
Buckley, is that the total damage award was ''unapportioned'' as between the injured 
plaintiffs Kelly and Betsy Buckley, whereas, in this case, the damage award ofS128,61 1.55 
is apportioned as to ReI, but is otherwise "unapPOltioned" --or incapable of division or 
assignment--as a covered or uncovered claim under EMe's policy. Therefore, despite this 
distinction, this case is analogous to Buckley because Buckley addresses the issue of how the 
court is to allocate an underlying jury verdict when the verdict is incapable of being allocated 
as either a covered or uncovered claim under an insurance policy. 
If the court follows Buckley, then the initial burden is on the DonneUys to first show 
the claim is "apparently" within EMC's policy coverage. Buckley, 112 Idaho at 122 
(emphasis added). The Donnellys can and have met this burden by the fact that EMC 
unde1100k to defend ReI and Ivan Rimar based on the Donnellys' claims being apparently 
covered under the EMC policy. Otherwise, EMC would have simply denied the claim, This 
apparent coverage served as a basis for the stay entered in this action pending the u,'ial in the 
Underlying Litigation. In other words, if there was no apparent coverage, there was no basis 
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to stay this action. In addition, the Donnellys alleged that RCI's poor workmanship had 
rendered portions of the Donnellys' residence uninhabitable, unusable and unsafe, causing a 
loss of use of those portions of the home, which EMC recognized as a potential property 
damage claim. (See Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. Judgment, pA, , , 6, 12). Further, the 
Donnellys' claims included property damage for heat mats that RCI cut when attempting to 
repair the DonneJIys I existing slate floor for damages arising from a "cracked" fa~ade 
engineered by Ivan Rimar. (Id. at p. 3, , 5). Therefore, the Donnellys can or have met any 
initial bW'den of showing their claim against RCI was apparently within EMC's policy 
coverage. 
This necessarily shifted the burden to EMC to show a substantial likelihood of 
overpayment should the Donnellys' unallocated verdict be paid. However, unlike 
Nationwide in Buckley, EMC can't meet this burden because the underlying verdict makes 
no allocation or apportionment of the damages that would otherwise allow EMC to show any 
lisk of overpayment should the underlying verdict be paid. This is because EMC's policy 
limit was $1,000,000 per occun'ence and the DonneUys' initial judgment of $128,611.55 was 
well below and within EMC's stated policy limit. Notably, EMC's duty to make 
supplementary payments doesn't reduce its policy limits, so it supplemental duty to pay the 
Donnellys' attomey's fees and costs and interest on the judgment poses no risk of 
overpayment and fill1her makes the Donnellys' argument that EMC's supplementary 
payments promises are "independentU of coverage under the policy. 
In addition, to date there is no evidence in the record that EMC informed or otherwise 
sought to infOlm RCI of its interest in the verdict form in the Underlying Litigation and the 
risks to RCI in the event it sought an unallocated verdict. The Buckley decision and the case 
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authority cited therein recognizes the patent unfairness in allowing an insurer, like EMC, to 
control the defense of its insured and, in doing so, potentially escape liability at the expense 
of its insured and its insured's judgment creditor by obtaining an unallocated verdict that 
places an impossible burden on the insureds and insured's judgment creditors to prove up 
coverage. 
As applied in this case, the court can find from the undisputed factual record that the 
Donnellys have met any initial burden to show their liability claims were apparently within 
EMC's policy coverage. Since EMC cannot meet its burden to prove a substantial likelihood 
of overpayment should the unallocated verdict be paid, the court can grant the Donnellys' 
motion for summary judgment and allocate the $128,611.55 verdict as payable under the 
EMC policy beeause it would clearly fall within EMC's $1,000,000 per occurrence policy 
limit. As previously noted, EMC's supplementary promise to pay the Donnellys' attorney's 
fees and costs and interest on the judgment does not reduce the limits of insurance and, 
therefore, has no effect on EMC's risk of overpayment. 
However, should the court find that EMC can show a substantial likelihood of 
overpayment if the unallocated verdict was paid, then the court can further apply the rationale 
Buckley and Duke v. Hoch, 468 F.2d 973, 984 (51h Cir. 1972) to further relieve the DonneUys 
of their burden to prove coverage and place the burden on EMC to show that it infolmed RCI 
of its interest in the underlying verdict fOlm and, if so, the COUlt can then allocate the 
damages "as best it can" as instructed by the Buckley court. Buckley v. Orem. 112 Idaho 
117. 125, 730 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Ct. App. 1986) (notably the Buckley court doesn't indicate 
how the trial court is to allocate the damages l only stating that it do "the best it can"). As 
recommended in Duke, this might include the court reviewing the Underlying Litigation trial 
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transcript containing evidence on which the jw)' based its verdict so the court, as the finder of 
fact and "as best it can," can make the allocation the jury would have made had it been given 
the opportunity to do so. See Duke v. Hoch, 468 F.2d 973, 984 (51h Cir. 1972). 
The Buckley and Duke decisions are instructive and offer a reasoned approach as to 
how the court might best apportion a jury verdict that is otherwise unapportioned or 
unallocated from the standpoint of insurance coverage. EMC's argument that all the 
damages are contractual or otherwise economic in nature seems to miss the mark given that 
under Special Verdict Question No. 26 the jury awarded the Donnellys SO in monetary 
damages for breach of contract despite finding a material breach of contract in answer to 
Question No.3. 
The fact that the jury awarded damages for breach of the implied walTanty under 
Question No. 30 necessarily implies the jury intended those damages to flow from the breach 
of the implied warranty found in answer to Question No. 6 and for something other than 
ReI's breach of contract. From this, it is reasonable to infer that the jury intended its 
compensatory award to include monies for "property damage" as opposed to just contractual 
or pure economic loss damage. Since the underlying verdict fOlm leaves the jury's intent in 
this regard to speculation, the Buckley and Duke decisions provide a reasoned approach to 
move the argument past argumentative speculation regarding the jury's intent. 
B. EMC HAS AN INDEPENDENT AND SUPPLEMENTARY DUTY TO PAY 
THE DONNELLYS' ATIORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TAXED AS COSTS AND 
INTEREST ON THE JUDGMENT. 
The EMC policy plainly states that EMC has "[n]o other obligation or liability to pay 
sums or perform acts or services is covered unless explicitly provided for under SUpj>lementaIy 
Payments-Coverages A and B. " (emphasis added). The policy plainly promises the following: 
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SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS - COVERAGES A AND B 
1, We [EMC] will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate, settle, or any 
"suit" against an insured we defend [i.e. EMC defended RCI ill the Underlying 
Litigation.] : 
e. All costs taxed against the insured in the "suit." [i.e. attorney's foes and 
costs taxed against ReI ill the Underlying Litigation.] 
g, All interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues after entry of 
the judgment and before we have paid. offered to pay, or deposited in the 
court the part of the judgment that is within the applicable limit of insurance. 
[i. e. All interest 01J the full amount of the Donnelly judgment.] 
These payments will not reduce the limits of insurance. [i.e. The obligation to 
make supplementalY payments is an independent promise from the promise to 
pay damages for bodily injury or property damage.] 
(Reid Aff. 1119/09 Ex. A.) (emphasis added.) 
In Idaho, insurance policies are interpreted under generalnJles of contract construction 
subject to certain special rules of construction. Arregon v. Fanners Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 
Idaho 459, 461, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008) (citation omitted.) In general, for a policy to be 
ambiguous it must be reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations, Id, (citations omitted). 
Because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, a special rule of constillction is "that 
any ambiguity that exists in the contract must be constl1led most strongly against the insurer," 
rd. (citation omitted.) Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous or not is a question of law. 
Id (emphasis added), 
The Donnellys' position has always been that the Supplementary Payments language 
in the EMC policy is plain and unambiguous. Therefore, it is and remains the Donnellys' 
position that the court can decide, as a matter of law. whether EMC has an independent and 
supplementary duty to pay the Donnellys' attomey's fees and costs taxed against ReI and 
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interest on the judgment, accordingly. It is and remains the Donnellys' position that there is 
DQ ambiguity in the Supplementary Payments language in the EMC policy a..nd this construction 
and conclusion finds direct support in the Idaho Supreme Court's decision of Mutual of 
Enumclaw v. Halvey. 115 Idaho 1009, 772 P.2d 216 (1989). The Donnellys note that EMC has 
never cited any Idaho autholit)' contrary to Hal'Vey. 
Specifically, the Donnellys nJ11her note that: FMC has never cited to the court any 
§llecific lanauage in its policy that conditions its sup:glementary promises to pay on coverage 
under either Coverage A or B. This is because no such language exists. Instead, EMC relies 
upon a policy argument recognized by Division Three of the Second Appellate Disttict of the 
Califomia Cowt of Appeals in State Fann v. Minatarsih, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009). However, the policy recognized in Minatasih ignores the plain language in the 
underlying insurance policy and, therefore, is in direct contravention of Idaho's rules of contract 
\ 
construction and the Harvey decision. Therefore, EMC's argument for the COUlt to follow 
Minatarsih, as opposed to Harvey. is a clear invitation to error because it asks the court to ignore 
Idaho law. EMC's policy argument is not new and was plainly rejected by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Harvey. 
As previously argued, in Harvey, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted then Distdct Judge 
Schroeder's analysis that the plain language of the supplemental payments provision in the 
Mutual of Enumclaw policy implied that the "provision contained therein a.re separate from and 
in addition to the basic policy coverage and, therefore, '" Mutual of Enumclaw's obligation to 
pay such costs is unaffected by the fact that the policy does not cover Oakes' intentionally 
tortuous conduct." Harvey, 115 Idaho at 1012. Judge Schroeder succinctly reasoned that the 
"[IJanguage in the policy of this case does not indicate that payment of costs is conditioned tm9n 
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a final detennination that the policy covers the insured's conduct. The language of the policy 
says that the Com~any will pay all costs taxed against the insured in any suit defended by the 
Com12any.':!d. (emphasis added). This is the same analysis and reasoning the DonneUys have 
applied to the plain and unambiguous language of the EMC policy. The Donnellys ask the com 
to apply this same analysis and reasoning in reconsideration of their motion for summary 
judgment. 
EMC's sole reliance on the policy decision in Mintarsih is noticeably weakened by the 
Division 1\vo of the Second Appellate District of the California Court of Appeals decision of 
Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, 86 
Cal.RptrJd 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) whereby EMC was awarded $400,000 against Philadelphia 
based on the same supplementary payments language in the Philadelphia CGL policy that is 
found in EMC's own policy at issue in this case. The point being that EMC will gladly benefit 
from the plain language of a COL policy's supplementary payments language when it is to 
EMC's own fmancial advantage but it will wholesale abandon that same plain language when it 
is applied to its own fmancial detriment. 
It is and remains the DonneJIys' position that the COUlt can rule, as a matter of law. that 
EMC has a supplementary duty to pay the Donnellys' attorney's fees and costs in the amount of 
$296,933.89 taxed as costs against RCI regardless of whether or not there is coverage for the 
undedying jUly verdict of $128,611.55. In addition, since EMC has never paid, offered to pay, 
or deposited with the court any part of the Donnellys' judgment that is within the applicable limit 
of insurance (there is no risk oveIpayment on a $1,000,000 limit), EMC should pay interest on 
the full amount of the judgment since the entry of the judgment. 
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. C. RCIAND IVAN RIMAR'S COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED. 
In EMC's prior motion for summary judgment, it argued for a dismissal of RCPs 
counterclaims based solely on its Settlement Agreement with RCI and Ivan Rimar. In reply to 
EMC's motion, the Donnellys argued that the Settlement Agreement was unenforceable as a 
fraudulent conveyance and, that to the extent EMC intended to rely on the Settlement Agreement 
to avoid paying the Donnellys as judgment creditors of ReI, the Donnellys asked the Court to 
fmd the agreement void to the extent it operates as a fraudulent conveyance against the 
Donnellys. Since that time,the Donnellys have been granted leave to amend their answer and 
assert a counterclaim seeking to void the Settlement Agreement as a fraudulent conveyance and 
have since pled this claim against EMC, ReI and Ivan Rimar as parties to the Settlement 
Agreement. 
Because the DonneUys have a pending counterclaim seeking to void the Settlement 
Agreement, it would be improper for the court to grant EMC summary judgment based on that 
same Agreement and dismiss RCPs counterclaims with prejudice creating a res judicata or claim 
preclusion defense for EMC in the event the Agreement is later set aside as a fraudulent 
conveyance. Notably, neither EMC nor RCI/Ivan Rimar made any prior attempt to submit a 
stipulation for dismissal based on the telms of the Settlement Agreement. This is aL'guably 
because both EMC and RCIIIvan Rimar treated the Agreement as having transfell'ed, by way of 
release or othelwise, RCI and Ivan Rimar's counterclaims to EMC. Regardless of EMC's 
arguments to the contrary, it appea.rs EMC is in control ofRCI and Ivan Rimae's counterclaims 
under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 
In sum, whether the Settlement Agreement is a fraudulent conveyance or not is a question 
of fact. See Idaho Code § 55-908. As a result, there are necessarily genuine issues of material 
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fact that would preclude dismissing RCI and Ivan Rimar's counterclaims against EMC based 
solely on a Settlement Agreement that may be determined to be a fraudulent conveyance as to 
the Donnellys as judgment creditors of RCI. At a minimwn, the Donnellys should be given 
additional time under I.R.C.P. 56(1) to conduct discovery against EMe, RCI and Ivan Rimar in 
support of their fraudulent conveyance claim. Under the circumstances, this causes no material 
prejudice to EMC because it can renew its motion at a later date and advance of trial. At some 
point, the court can recognize the Settlement Agreement for what it is-an intended "safe 
harbor" to shelter EMC from paying the DonneUys in the event it lost on the merits of this 
action. Therefore the court must necessarily deny EMC's motion to reconsider this request 
which was already implicitly denied by the court previously. 
CONCLUSION 
The Donnellys respectfully ask the court to reconsider It prior Order Denying O'oss-
Motions for Summary Judgment and, in reconsideration of this motion and the Donnellys' prior 
Motion for Summary Judgment, grant the Donnellys summary judgment, in whole or in part, as 
a matter of law and deny EMC's motion to reconsider, accordingly. 
DATED this L day of September, 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the L day of September, 2010, I selVed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claibome 
Ringed Clark Chartered 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, ID 83701-2773 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
PhilIabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane) W A 99201 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
_VP-_ F'lacNsimile (208) 342-4657 
US Mail 
_ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
~csimile (509) 625-1909 
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CASE NO. CV-2007-0000885 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife, 
ORDER re: MOTIONS FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Defendants. 
Partial summary judgment is granted in favor of Employers Mutual 
Casualty Company as to whether there is coverage for the claims of (1) breach of 
implied warranty of workmanship by Rimar Construction, Inc., and (2) violations 
of Idaho's Consumer Protection Act by Rimar Construction, Inc., for which the 
jury found liability in the underlying litigation. Neither of these claims are 
covered. 
Partial summary judgment is granted in favor of David and Kathy 
Donnelly as to whether EMC is required to pay the attorneys' fees and court costs 
taxed against Rimar Construction, Inc., in the underlying litigation. Employers 
Mutual Casualty Company is responsible for the $296,933.89 in attorneys' fees 
and costs previously awarded to the Donnellys, as well as any interest on that 
judgment which has accrued. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 12, 2009, Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company (hereafter, 
"EMC") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking a declaratory judgment holding that 
EMC has no duty or responsibility to pay any of the damages awarded to David and Kathy 
Donnelly (hereafter, "Donnellys") in the underlying litigation, Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, 
Inc .. et al.. Bonner County Case No. CV-2006-0445. 
On December 21, 2009, the Donnellys filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, requesting 
that EMC be ordered to pay the Donnellys' judgment, in whole or in part, on behalf of its 
insured, Rimar Construction, Inc. (hereafter, "RCI"). 
On April 7, 2010, the Court entered an "Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment," detennining that summary judgment was improper because: (1) the parties failed to 
meet their respective burdens of persuasion; and (2) inferences could be drawn from the 
language of the policy in relation to the facts presented which could result in conflicting results. 
On July 8, 2010, the Donnellys filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying 
summary judgment. On August 23, 2010, EMC also filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The 
parties' motions for reconsideration came before the Court for hearing on September 8,2010. 
Judicial notice is taken of the facts presented in the underlying litigation, the legal 
theories relied upon by the Donnellys as reflected in their Amended Complaint, and the jurors' 
conclusions set forth in their Special Verdict. The parties also enumerated undisputed facts in 
their requests for summary judgment. These undisputed facts have also been considered. 
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II. STANDARD 
A motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is governed by Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11, which provides, in part: 
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be 
made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen 
(14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of 
any order of the trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within 
fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there shall be no 
motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial court entered on any motion 
filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b). 
I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B). 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 212 P.3d 
982 (2009), set forth the standard for granting or denying a motion for reconsideration: 
A decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration made 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure II(a)(2)(B) is left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea 
Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 212, 177 P .3d 955, 959 (2008). 
Id. at 560, 212 P.3d at 990. 
The standard to be applied for granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is 
outlined in the April 7, 2010, Order. 
III. DISCUSSION 
In essence, the Donnellys have three claims in this action. They all relate to their 
overarching position that EMC is obligated under its insurance policy to pay for the damages 
awarded in the underlying litigation. 
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The Donnellys' claims are summarized as follows: 
1. A claim for $126,611.55 in actual damages awarded in the underlying litigation for 
RCI's breach of the implied warranty of workmanship; 
2. A claim for $2,000.00 in statutory damages awarded in the underlying litigation for 
RCI's violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; and 
3. A claim for $296,933.89 in attorneys' fees and court costs taxed against RCI in the 
underlying litigation. 
These claims will each be addressed in the sequence set forth above. 
A. There Is No Coverage For Damages Sustained By The DonneJlys For Breach Of The 
Implied Warranty Of Workmanship. 
To understand why the jury's award of compensatory damages for breach of the implied 
warranty of workmanship is a contract based claim involves a review of the jury's decision as 
related to the instructions provided, the causes of action pled by the Donnellys, the law of the 
underlying case, and Idaho's appellate decisions. 
1. The Jury Instructions 
In the underlying litigation, the jury found there was a breach of contract, but awarded no 
damages for that specific cause of action. The jury verdict of $126,611.55 was based solely on 
the legal theory of breach of the implied warranty of workmanship. 
The jury was given the following instructions on the implied warranty of workmanship: 
Instruction No. 47 
The Donnellys allege that Rimar Construction, Inc., breached implied warranties 
by failing to perform the agreed upon construction in a workmanlike manner. 
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Instruction No. 48 
An implied warranty is an obligation imposed by the law when there has been no 
representation or promise. Such a warranty arises by operation of law because of the 
circumstances. 
Instruction No. 49 
The implied warranty of workmanship imposes a duty to perform III a 
workmanlike manner. 
Instruction No. 50 
In a construction contract, there is an implied warranty that the work is to be 
completed in a workmanlike manner. Resolution of the question of whether the buyer 
has received that which he bargained for does not depend upon the status of the buyer or 
ultimate user; it depends upon the quality of the dwelling delivered and the expectations 
of the parties. 
The implied warranty does not require a builder to build a perfect house free from 
any and all minor defects. 
Instruction No. 51 
With regard to the claim of the implied warranty of workmanship, the Donnellys 
have the burden of proving each of the following: 
1. A contract existed between Rimar Construction, Inc., and the Donnellys; 
2. Rimar Construction, Inc., rendered services to the Donnellys; 
3. Rimar Construction, Inc., failed to perform services in a workmanlike 
manner; 
4. Failing to perform services in a workmanlike manner by Rimar 
Construction, Inc., was the proximate cause of damages to the Donnellys; 
and 
5. The elements of damage, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the foregoing elements 
have been proven, then you must find in favor of the Donnellys on this issue. If you find 
from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has not 
been proven, your verdict should be for Rimar Construction, Inc. 
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2. The Donnellys' Amended Complaint 
In their Amended Complaint, the Donnellys alleged that there were a large number of 
material breaches of the contract and that such breaches resulted in various accidental, incidental, 
collateral, consequential, and/or negligent damage and injury. (Plaintiffs' Amended Verified 
Complaint, at, 10). As a result of the alleged breaches, the Donnellys claimed in their Amended 
Complaint that they sustained "damage to property, physical injury to tangible property," "loss 
of use regarding said property," "damages for the diminution to the value of the home," as well 
as "property damage to the original structure of the Plaintiffs' residence .... " (Plaintiffs' 
Amended Verified Complaint, at " 11 and 12). 
In regard to the breach of the implied warranty claim, the Donnellys alleged: 
33. Implied in law in the services and materials provided by Defendant 
RCI, or overseen by RCI, is the warranty of workmanship that all 
work performed will meet or exceed the standards of workmanship 
expected for the construction trades involved. 
34. Additionally, Defendant Ivan Rimar provided express and implied 
warranties that the design and construction of the front and side 
porches would be structurally sound and adequate for the home. 
(Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint, at" 33 and 34). 
3. Previous Rulings - The Law of the Underlying Case 
After the verdict and the original judgment were entered, the Donnellys were awarded 
costs as a matter of right, as well as attorneys' fees totaling $296,933.89. This award was based 
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on a number of factors, including, but not limited to: 
(1) The basic issue litigated by the parties was whether the construction was 
completed in a workmanlike manner; 
(2) The Donnellys proved that RCI failed to adequately perform the work it 
contracted to perform; 
(3) The agreement between the Donnellys and RCI was a commercial 
transaction; 
(4) Costs and fees were awarded because the gravamen of the action and the 
resulting verdict was based on a contract based commercial transaction; 
and 
(5) The jury did not return a verdict in favor of the Donnellys on a tort based 
legal theory. 
The above ruling awarding costs and fees was not appealed. 
4. Idaho's Appellate Decisions Characterizing Actions as Tort or Contract 
In the precise context presented in this case, there are no Idaho appellate cases which 
have decided whether the breach of the implied warranty of workmanship is contract based or 
tort based. 
In Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc., 140 Idaho 349, 93 P.3d 680 (2004), the Idaho 
Supreme Court examined case law and quoted Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138, 483 P.2d 
664,669 (1971), which states: 
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The law governing the ability to obtain remedies for breach of contract, as well as 
tortious behavior, is confusing, with few, if any, court decisions on the subject. 
Ordinarily, a breach of contract is not a tort. A contract may, however, create a 
state of things that furnishes the occasion for a tort. 38 AmJur. 662, Negligence § 
20. If the relation of the plaintiff and the defendants is such that a duty to take due 
care arises therefrom irrespective of contract and the defendant is negligent, then 
the action is one of tort. To found an action in tort, there must be a breach of duty 
apart from the nonperformance of a contract. 52 AmJur. 379, Torts, § 26. 
Id at 353,93 P.3d at 684. 
The Sumpter Court went on to state: 
As Taylor states above, "[i]fthe relation of the plaintiff and the defendants 
is such that a duty to take due care arises therefrom irrespective of contract and 
the defendant is negligent, then the action is one of tort." Citing the United States 
Supreme Court, this Court further held: 
The distinction is that: If the cause of complaint be for an act of omission or 
nonfeasance, which, without proof of a contract to do what has been left undone, 
would not give rise to any cause of action (because no duty apart from contract to 
do what is complained of exists), then the action is founded upon contract, and not 
upon tort. 
94 Idaho at 138,483 P.2d at 669, quoting Atlantic & P. Railway Co. v. Laird, 164 
U.S. 393, 399, 17 S.Ct. 120, 122,41 L.Ed. 485, 487 (1896). See also Hudson v. 
Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474,477-78, 797 P.2d 1322, 1325-26 (1990). It can also be said 
that if a cause of action for breach of a duty based on a contractual promise could 
also be maintained without the contract by virtue of a statutory or common law 
duty, then the action is founded upon tort, not contract. 
Id at 353-354, 483 P.2d at 684-685. 
A complication in analysis is attendant to the characterization of the cause of action when 
considering whether there was solely "economic loss" as opposed to "property damage." In 
Aardema v. Us. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 215 P.3d 505 (2009), the Idaho Supreme 
Court discussed this issue: 
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Economic loss is distinguishable from property damage, which would be 
recoverable under a tort claim. "Property damage encompasses damage to 
property other than that which is the subject of the transaction." Ramerth v. Hart, 
133 Idaho 194, 196,983 P.2d 848, 850 (1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc., 97 Idaho at 351 544 P.2d at 309). This 
Court has not defined the "subject of the transaction," instead relying on factual 
comparisons from previous decisions. Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 
296, 301, 108 P 3d 996, 1001 (2005) (finding that the house and the lot are the 
subject of the transaction and, therefore, constitute economic loss where the 
allegation is damage to the house from the settling foundation); Ramerth, 133 
Idaho at 197, 983 P .2d at 851 (finding that repair of the engine is the subject of 
the transaction if the allegedly negligent repair subsequently causes need for 
further repair to the engine); Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200 (finding 
that no property loss, other than property which is the subject of the transaction, 
existed when delivered and certified seed is found to contain bacterial ring rot); 
TuschEnter. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 41, 740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987) (holding 
that allegations of negligent design and construction of a duplex is barred by the 
economic loss rule); Oppenheimer Indus., Inc., 112 Idaho at 426, 732 P.2d at 664 
(holding that tort action may be maintained when the plaintiff alleged that his 
cattle were sold without his permission because the cattle brand inspector failed to 
verify cattle ownership prior to the sale). This line of cases delineates a clear 
pattern that this Court has implicitly defined the "subject of the transaction" by 
the subject matter of the contract. 
Id at 791, 215 P.3d at 511 (footnote omitted). 
Other jurisdictions have held that the breach of the implied warranty of workmanship is 
contractual in nature and not tortious. In Illinois, it was determined that "recovery generally 
cannot be had in tort for what is termed purely economic loss. Economic loss has been defined as 
damages for inadequate value and/or costs of repair." Meyers v. Woods, 374 Ill. App. 3d 440, 
448,871 N.E.2d 160, 168 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 2007) (citations omitted). In Meyers, the Illinois 3rd 
district appellate court stated: 
Illinois courts have rejected a tort cause of action in cases where a 
construction contract is breached because the work was not performed in a 
workmanlike manner. Our supreme court has held that when a plaintiff seeks 
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recovery for faulty construction alleging the defendant failed to perform in a 
workmanlike manner, which resulted in eventual deterioration and the losses 
alleged are solely economic, there can be no recovery under a negligence theory. 
Foxcroft Townhome Owners Association v. Hoffman Rosner Corporation, 96 
Il1.2d 150, 156-57, 70 Ill.Dec."251, 449 N.E.2d 125, 128 (1983) .... In Illinois, 
tort-based theories of recovery are generally inappropriate if the damages suffered 
are purely economic and the subject matter of contract. 
The ordinary rule applied in building contract cases is that a builder is held 
only to a duty of substantial performance in a workmanlike manner, and that 
failure to perform in a workmanlike manner constitutes a breach of contract 
entitling the plaintiff to damages. Mayfield v. Swafford, 106 Ill.App.3d 610, 612, 
62 Ill.Dec. 155, 435 N.E.2d 953, 954 (1982). Thus, once a breach of contract has 
been found by the defendant's failure to perform in a workmanlike manner, the 
issue then becomes calculation of damages. 
Id at 449,453,871 N.E.2d at 168, 172. 
In Heath v. Palmer, 181 Vt. 545, 915 A.2d 1290 (2006), the Vermont Supreme Court 
ruled that the trial court properly rejected the plaintiff homeowners' claim against the defendant 
property development company for "contractor's negligence." The court found that "plaintiffs' 
remedy for the purely economic losses resulting from the reduced value or costs of repairs of the 
construction defects sounded in contract rather than tort." Id at 550, 915 A.2d at 1296. In 
Heath, the Vermont Supreme Court also recognized that "[t]he limitation to contract remedies in 
this context is the general rule in most other jurisdictions, as well," including, Arizona, Idaho, 
Illinois, Kansas, Nevada, and Utah. Id at 550,915 A.2d at 1296-1297. 
5. Summary of Ruling Concerning Compensatory Damages 
It appears that the cause of action of breach of the implied warranty of workmanship 
sounds in contract, not tort, as previously concluded by the Court in the underlying action. The 
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breach of the implied warranty of workmanship is most closely related to a breach of contract, 
and under the unique circumstances and the particular facts presented in this case, this Court 
holds that damages for a breach of the implied warranty of workmanship under EMC's policy 
are not covered. 
EMC's Commercial General Liability insurance policy does not act as a performance 
bond; and it does not provide for payment of damages resulting from a breach of contract. In 
fact, such damages are excluded from coverage. Because no award was made by the jury for any 
tort cause of action that was pled and submitted, and because the breach of the implied warranty 
of workmanship as presented in the underlying case was a contract related breach, EMC has no 
obligation to pay the compensatory damages in the amount of $126,611.55 previously awarded 
to the Donnellys. 
B. The $2,000.00 Idaho Consumer Protection Act Judgment Is Not Covered. 
The Donnellys were awarded $2,000.00 in damages for RCI's violations of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. There are two reasons why these damages are not covered. First, 
these damages are a category of damages that are strictly statutory in nature and not associated 
with either the loss of use of property or with physical injury to tangible property. As such, there 
is no coverage for damages resulting from RCI's failure to comply with the Act. Thus, the 
Donnellys' claim for Idaho Consumer Protection Act damages is a claim which is not within the 
coverage terms ofEMC's Commercial General Liability Policy. 
Second, to establish violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, the Donnellys had 
to establish that RCI engaged in conduct which was prohibited by the Act either with actual 
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such knowledge. See Idaho Code § 48-603. The portions of the Act under which the Donnellys 
argued liability against RCI involve deception, falsity, failure to perform promises, misleading 
conduct, and failure to follow statutory requirements (e.g., nondisclosures). The policy's 
Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion absolutely bars coverage for any bodily injury or property 
damage that is expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured or any of its employees. 
For the Donnellys to prevail on their claim of violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, 
they had to prove that RCI knowingly violated the provisions of the Act. This would require that 
RCI would reasonably expect damage to occur if it violated the Act. Thus, the statutory damages 
for which RCI is legally obligated to pay to the Donnellys on account of violations of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act are not covered under EMC's policy. 
C. EMC Is Responsible For Payment Of Costs And Fees Previously Awarded. 
When a business entity's or individual's insurance company provides a lawyer to 
represent that defendant, the insurance company has a right to control the litigation. 
Concomitant with this right to control is a duty to exercise diligence, intelligence, good faith, as 
well as honest and conscientious fidelity to the common interest of the company and the insured. 
Thus, by controlling the defense of a case, the insurance company can potentially put its insured 
"at risk" when litigation decisions are made. 
In this case, EMC argues that the Supplementary Payments provision of the policy must 
be tied to an initial finding that there is in fact coverage. This argument, however, is not 
supported by existing case law. 
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1. Policy Interpretation 
In Idaho, when interpreting insurance policies, courts apply the general rules of contract 
law subject to certain special rules of construction. Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Idaho, 
145 Idaho 459, 461, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008). In Farm Bureau Insurance Co. of Idaho v. 
Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415,234 P.3d 739 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court enumerated those special 
rules: 
Because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion that are not usually 
subject to negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity in a policy is construed 
strongly against the insurer. Where the language used in an insurance policy is 
clear and unambiguous, the language must be given its plain, ordinary meaning. 
Coverage will be detennined according to the plain meaning of the words in the 
policy. A provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject 
to conflicting interpretations. If confronted with ambiguous language, the 
reviewing court must detennine what a reasonable person would understand the 
language to mean. 
234 P.3d at 743 (internal citations omitted). 
Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law over which courts exercise free 
review. Arreguin, 145 Idaho at 461, 180 P.3d at 500. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that insurance contracts shall be construed "in a 
light most favorable to the insured and in a manner which will provide full coverage for the 
indicated risks rather than to narrow its protection." Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm 
Bureau Insurance Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d 751, 754 (2005) (quoting Smith v. OIP 
Transp., 128 Idaho 697,700,918 P.2d 281, 284 (1996)). 
Using these fundamental precepts as a starting point, an examination of the operative 
language of EMC's policy is in order. The policy states: "No other obligation or liability to pay 
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sums or perJorm acts or services is covered unless explicitly provided Jor under Supplementary 
Payments - Coverages A and B." The Supplementary Payments provision of the policy 
provides: 
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS - COVERAGES A AND B 
1. We will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate or settle, or any "suit" 
against an insured we defend: 
e. All costs taxed against the insured in the "suit" 
g. All interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues after entry 
of the judgment and before we have paid, offered to pay, or deposited 
in the court the part of the judgment that is within the applicable limit 
of insurance. 
These payments will not reduce the limits of insurance. 
This language plainly states that with respect to any suit pursued against an insured which 
it defends, EMC will pay all costs taxed against that insured. The language appears to be 
unambiguous, and thus, it must be given its plain meaning. EMC has never set forth any specific 
language in its policy that ties its promise to pay costs on a finding that there is coverage. 
Because EMC defended its insured, RCI, in the underlying litigation, EMC is responsible to the 
Donnellys for the $296,933.89 in fees and costs taxed against RCI in that lawsuit, as well as any 
interest on that judgment which has accrued. 
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the language of the Supplementary Payments 
provision is subject to the conflicting interpretation offered by EMC that payment of costs and 
interest should be tied to an initial finding of coverage, the policy does not plainly state that 
payment of assessed costs must be made only if there is coverage. At best, when viewing the 
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policy from EMC's perspective, the "Supplementary Payments" heading, when read in context 
with the language of Paragraph 1 (beginning with "We will pay .,. "), is ambiguous. Any 
ambiguity, however, is to be construed strongly against EMC and in favor of the Donnellys, and 
"in a manner which will provide full coverage for the indicated risks rather than to narrow its 
protection." Cascade Auto Glass, supra. Pursuant to these rules of interpretation, EMC is still 
responsible to the Donnellys for the payment of the costs and interest awarded in the underlying 
litigation. 
2. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Harvey 
In Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009, 772 P.2d 216 (1989), the Idaho 
Supreme Court addressed a similar issue. The Supreme Court concluded that even though there 
was no coverage, the "costs" taxed against the insured were payable by the insurance company, 
Mutual of Enumclaw. Similar to the facts in this case, Mutual of Enumclaw's "Supplementary 
Coverages 2" provision of the policy provided that the insurance company would pay" ... all 
costs taxed against the insured in any suit defended by the Company." Id at 1011, 772 P.2d at 
218. There, as here, the insurer argued that the payment of the insured's costs incurred in the 
underlying case was dependent on whether there was coverage of the underlying claims in that 
suit. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed Fourth Judicial District Judge Gerald 
F. Schroeder's reasoning and quoted his opinion as its own. 
Again, similar to the provision in EMC's policy, Mutual of Enumclaw's policy provided 
that the payment of costs would not reduce the applicable limit of liability. 
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Judge Schroeder stated: 
The results in the cases depend 'upon the language employed by the parties in 
their contract.' 76 ALR 2D 985. Language in the policy of this case does not 
indicate that payment of costs is conditioned upon a final determination that the 
policy covers the insured's conduct. The language of the policy says that the 
Company will pay all costs taxed against the insured in any suit defended by the 
Company. Beyond what appears to be the clear term of the policy, it is arguable 
that since the Company has the right to control the defense, including the power 
to refuse settlement, it should also bear the consequences of its case management 
decisions, including the consequence that the trial court may tax the opponent's 
costs against the insured. 
Mutual of Enumclaw, 115 Idaho at 1012, 772 P.2d at 219 (citations omitted). 
In Mutual of Enumclaw, as in this case, the issue of "reservation of rights" arose. As to 
that issue, Judge Schroeder reasoned: 
Mutual of Enumclaw also argues that undertaking Oakes' defense with a 
reservation of rights exonerates it from having to pay costs. The court rejects this 
contention. It is generally recognized that coverage defenses may be properly 
preserved by a reservation of rights agreement. 'Preservation' implies the 
continuation, the saving of something that existed. It is not a destruction of the 
insured's rights nor a creation of new rights for the Company. It preserves that to 
which the parties had originally agreed. Mutual of Enumclaw, in Section II, 
Supplementary Coverages 2.a. agreed to pay 'all costs taxed against the insured in 
any suit defended by the Company.' The fact the company reserved its contractual 
rights before undertaking the defense in no way dissipates its obligation to pay 
such costs. 
Mutual of Enumclaw, 115 Idaho at 1013, 772 P.2d at 220 (internal citations omitted). 
Thus, a unanimous Idaho Supreme Court and a future Chief Justice of the Idaho Supreme 
Court both concluded that the insurance carrier must stand behind its promise to pay costs in the 
underlying litigation when the language of the policy plainly provides it will do so. Although 
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EMC points to the distinction in the headings of the provisions of the two policies that address 
the required payment of costs, such a distinction does not disturb the core of the promise to pay 
costs when the insurance company defends the case. 
If EMC wanted to tie the payment of costs in the underlying suit to a finding of coverage, 
it, using plain language, could have easily done so. EMC could have simply stated that it would 
only pay costs taxed against its insured if there was coverage under the policy. It did not do so. 
D. Resolution of RCl's Counterclaims 
The Donnellys objected to the settlement of this case between EMC and RCI and filed a 
cause of action claiming that such settlement should not be accepted by the Court. This decision 
may make such cause of action moot. The Court declines to address that issue at this time and 
will nottake any further action pending discussion by the respective parties. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants partial summary judgment in favor of EMC as 
to whether there is coverage for the claims of (l) breach of implied warranty of workmanship by 
RCI, and (2) violations of Idaho's Consumer Protection Act by RCI, for which the jury found 
liability in the underlying litigation. Neither of these claims are covered. 
The Court grants partial summary judgment in favor of the Donnellys as to whether EMC 
is required to pay the attorneys' fees and court costs taxed against RCI in the underlying 
litigation. EMC is responsible for the $296,933.89 in attorneys' fees and costs previously 
awarded to the Donnellys, as well as any interest on that judgment which has accrued. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this sf'Lday of November, 2010. 
d~;:;* 
District Judge 
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MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS 
COUNSEL OF RECORD 
COMES NOW Michael A. Ealy of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, LLP and pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. Rule 11(b)(2) moves the Court for entry of an Order Granting Leave to Withdraw as 
attorneys of record for the Defendants DAVID and KATHY DONNELLY in the above-
captioned matter. 
This motion is based on the affidavit of Michael A. Ealy filed herewith that sets forth 
good cause for granting the motion to withdraw. 
DATED this Ic;d.ay of December, 2010. 
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CASE NO. CV-2007-0000885 
ORDER GRANTING LEA VE 
TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
On December 16,2010, Michael A. Ealy and the firm of RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP, 
moved the court, pursuant to Rule 11 (b )(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for an Order 
Granting Leave to Withdraw as attorneys of record for Defendants David Donnelly and Kathy 
Donnelly. Mr. Ealy has determined that it is in both his clients' and his own best interest that he 
withdraw from their representation for the reasons set forth in Rule 1. 16(b )( 4), 1.16(b)( 6), and 
1.16(b )(7) of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the court having considered the motion, and for good cause shown, 
IT IS ORDERED that: 
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1. MICHAEL A. EAL Y and the firm of RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP are hereby 
granted leave to withdraw as the attorneys of record for David and Kathy 
Donnelly in the above-entitled matter. 
2. MICHAEL A. EAL Y shall forthwith, and with due diligence, serve a copy of this 
Order upon David and Kathy Donnelly, via certified mail, or by personal 
service, to the last known address most likely to give them notice, and service 
shall be complete upon mailing. MICHAEL A. EAL Y shall then file an Affidavit 
of proof of service of the same with the court, specifying the method of service 
and if service was accomplished by certified mail, and listing the mailing address 
of David and Kathy Donnelly. 
3. David and Kathy Donnelly shall appoint another attorney to appear, or shall 
appear in person by filing a written notice with the court, stating how they will 
proceed without an attorney, within 20 days from the date of service or mailing 
of the Order. 
4. Upon entry of the Order, no further proceedings shall be had in the above-
entitled matter which will affect the rights of David and Kathy Donnelly for a 
period of 20 days after service or mailing of the Order. 
S. If David and Kathy Donnelly do not file and serve an additional written 
appearance in the above-entitled matter, in person or through a newly appointed 
attorney within the 20-day period, such failure shall be sufficient ground for the 
entry of default and the entry of a default judgment against them without 
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further notice. 
6. The last known address (or David and Kathy Donnelly is: P.O. Box 885, Eden, 
Utah 84310. 
DATED this ~y of January, 2011. 
~~ . . Steve Yerby 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this ~ day of January, 2011, to: 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, ET AL. 
421 West Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, Washington 99201 
Attorneys for Rimar Construction, Inc. 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
RINGERT CLARK CHARTERED 
455 South Third Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneys for Employers Mutual Casualty Co. 
Michael A. Ealy 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Attorneys for David and Kathy Donnelly 
DAVID AND KATHY DONNELLY 
P.O. Box 885 
Eden, Utah 84310 
Depu y Clerk 
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01/12/2011 WED 17:18 FAX 3459564 
ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 383 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB. No. 1626 
Attorneys for Defendants, David Donnelly and Kathy Donnelly 
: 
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RlMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; and DAVID DONNELLY) 





Case No. CV-2007-885 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
TO: The above-named plaintiff, and its attorney of record, James O. Reid: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That Allen B. Ellis, of the firm of Ellis, Brown & 
Sheils, Chartered, 707 North 8th Street, P.O. Box 388, Boise, Idaho 83701, hereby enters the 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1 
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I 01/12/2.011 WED 17: 18 FAX 3459564 1lI004/004 
appearance of said fum as attorneys of record for defendants, David Donnelly and Kathy Donnelly, 
in this action. 
DATED This 12tb day of January, 2011. 
~~. 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 12th day of January, 201109, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Law Chartered 
455 South Third Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 
AlIenB. s 
.. , .\ £. 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
__ Hand delivery 
__ Overnight delivery 
---2L Facsimile (342-4657) 
STATE Or- ;,Ji ii_~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 















CASE NO. CV-2007-0000885 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
re: MOTIONS FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Defendants. 
Employers Mutual Casualty Company's (EMC's) request for summary judgment 
as to the counterclaims against it brought by Rimar Construction, Inc., (RCI) is 
denied because genuine issues of material fact exist. These issues relate to 
whether the Settlement Agreement between EMC, RCI, and Ivan Rimar is a 
fraudulent conveyance. 
By letter to the Court dated December 17,2010, counsel for Employers Mutual Casualty 
Company (EMC) requested that the Court render a decision on whether the Settlement 
Agreement between EMC and Rimar Construction, Inc., (RCI) would result in the granting of 
summary judgment in EMC's favor as to the counterclaims brought against it by RCI. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER re: MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1 
After this request was made, counsel for David and Kathy Donnelly moved to withdraw 
from the representation and an order was issued allowing counsel to withdraw. The Donnellys 
now have new counsel, who has made a formal appearance in this action, and the issue of 
whether EMC is entitled to summary judgment against RCI will be addressed. 
In the Donnellys' response to the request by EMC to dismiss RCI's counterclaims, the 
Donnellys argued that the Settlement Agreement was unenforceable as a fraudulent conveyance, 
and that to the extent EMC intended to rely on the Settlement Agreement to avoid paying the 
Donnellys as judgment creditors of RCI, the Court should find the agreement void. The 
Donnellys were granted leave to amend their Answer and assert a counterclaim seeking to void 
the Settlement Agreement as a fraudulent conveyance, and have since pled this claim against 
EMC, RCI, and Ivan Rimar as parties to the Settlement Agreement. 
As the Donnellys pending counterclaim seeks to void the Settlement Agreement, it would 
be improper to grant EMC summary judgment based on that same agreement and dismiss RCI's 
counterclaims with prejudice. This would create a res judicata or claim preclusion defense for 
EMC in the event the Settlement Agreement is later set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. When 
all inferences are considered in favor of the nonmoving party, it is notable that neither EMC nor 
RCIlIvan Rimar made any earlier attempt to submit a stipulation for dismissal based on the terms 
of the Settlement Agreement. This is arguably because both EMC and RCIlIvan Rimar treated 
the agreement as having transferred, by way of release or otherwise, RCI and Ivan Rimar's 
counterclaims to EMC. Even though EMC argues the contrary position, EMC may factually be 
in control of RCI and Ivan Rimar's counterclaims under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 
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There appear to be genuine issues of material fact which preclude dismissing RCI and 
Ivan Rimar's counterclaims against EMC at this time. Whether the Settlement Agreement is a 
fraudulent conveyance is a question of fact. See Idaho Code § 55-908. 
Regardless of whether there are material issues of fact, the DonneUys previously 
requested that they be given additional time pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(f) to conduct additional 
discovery on this factual issue in support of their fraudulent conveyance claim. In the exercise of 
the trial court's discretion, it appears that discovery on this issue causes no material prejudice to 
EMC because it can renew its motion to dismiss RCI's counterclaims at a later date in advance 
of trial. Further, in light of the fact that the Donnellys have new representation, it would be 
appropriate to allow additional time for consultation between the clients and their lawyer to 
determine if their fraudulent conveyance claim should be pursued, as obtaining enough proof to 
establish a prima facie case is rife with difficulty when consideration is given to the protections 
afforded by the attorney-client privilege and the work product principle. 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, EMC's request for summary judgment as 
to the counterclaims against it brought by RCI is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this Lf~ay of February, 2011. 
5t-~~ ,. Steve Verby 
District Judge 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER re: MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERA TION - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
;] hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this ~ day of February, 2011, to: 
Brent C. Featherston 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Attorneys for Rimar Construction, Inc. 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, MATTHEWS & SHELDON 
421 West Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, Washington 99201 
Attorneys for Rimar Construction; Inc. 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
RINGERT CLARK CHARTERED 
455 South Third Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Attorneys for Employers Mutual Casualty Co. 
Allen B. Ellis 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
Attorneys for David and Kathy Donnelly 
Deputy Clerk 
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" 
JAMES G. REID. ISB # 1372 
r- " " ,. 
,l ." 
DA VID P. CLArBORNE. ISH # 6579 
RINGERT LA W CHARTERED ORIGINAL ZOII FEB I 8 fA 10: /. 
1 
455 South ll1ird Street 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-mail ;dpc@ringeI11aw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
It-
TN THE DISTRTCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR TI IF. COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTlJAL CAStlALTY 
COMPANY. an Iowa corporation; 
Plainti11 
vs. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC.. an Idaho 
corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y. husband a'nd wite; and IV AN 
RIMAR, an individual: 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2007-00885 
STIPULATION 
COMES NOW the Plaintitf. Employers Mutual Casualty Company. by and through its 
attorney of record. James G. Reid. and the Defendants. Rimar Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar, by 
and through their attorney of record. Stephen D. Phillabaum. and the Defendants. David and Kathy 
Donnelly, by and through their attorney of record, Allen B. Ellis: and 
STIPULATION - I 
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WHEREAS. the Court has isslJ~d its Order rei ,\;/olioI1S/llr Recollsideration on November 
5.2010. 
WHEREAS the parties in this matter wish to enter into stipulated dismissals with respect 
to certain counterclaims and cross-claims in this matter in order that a final judgment may be entered 
herein. 
WHEREAS for the purposes of this Stipulation only the term "Settlement Agrecment" 
references that cel1ain settlement agreement entered into between Plaintiff Employers Mutual 
Casualty Company. on the one halld. and Defendants RimaI' Construction. Inc., and Ivan Rimar on 
the other. on August 17.2009. 
Based upon the foregoing premises. IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED: 
1. The parties stipulate and agree. PURSlJANT TO Rule 41 (a)(1 )(ii), LR.C.P., that 
Defendants Rimar Construction. Inc. and Ivan Rimar's counterclaims. set forth in 
Rel's Amended Answer to PlainlUT's Amended PeTitionfor Declaratory Judgment. 
filed on or about July 9. 2009. be and are herehy DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE, said dismissal being made to conform with the Settlement 
Agreement; and 
2. The parties stipulate and agree. PlJRSlJANT TO Rule 41(a)(l)(ii). I.R.C.P., that 
Defendant David and Kathy Donnelly's cOllnterclaim and cross-claim for fraudulent 
conveyance. set forth at Section lII.B.ofthe Second Amended An.n1'er, Counterclaim 
and Cross Claim against I van Rimar and Rimar Construction, Inc. , filed on or about 
.luly 12.2010. be and is herehy DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, each party to 
STIPULATION - 2 
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· . 
bear their own costs and fees: and 
3. The parties further stipulate and agree that Plaintiff: Employers Mutual Casualty 
Company and Defendant. Rimar Construction. Inc. and Defendant. Ivan Rimar. shall 
not assert any defense. whether by claim of avoidance or othenvise. in reliance on the 
Settlement Agreement. and including Hartman v. United Heritage Property and 
Casualty Co .. 141 Idaho 193, 1089 P.3d 340 (2005). in this action or in any 
subsequent appeal. to the on-going and continuing standing of the Defendants David 
and Kathy Donnelly. to seek the recovery or payment of monies direct from the 
Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company in satisfaction of the Amended 
Judgment On SjJecio/ Ven/iel With Regard to Claims olPlaintiff.\· And Defendant 
Rimar Cons/ruclion. Inc. entered in Donnelly v. RimaI' Construction. Inc .. et aL Case 
No. CV-06-00445 (Bonner County. Idaho). 
4. The parties stipulate and agree that the Court may enter a final judgment upon the 
request ofeither the PlaintitTor Defendant's David and Kathy Donnelly based on the 
Order re: MOlionsfor Reconsideration, dated November 5, 2010, and the trial date 
of Apr i) 25, 2011 may be vacated accordingly as it is the intent that this Stipulation 
leave no further issues for further adjudication by trial with the exception of issues 
pertaining to Rule 54, I.R.C.P., costs and attorney fees. 
STIPULA nON - 3 
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By reason of the above and foregoing stipulations. the undersigned respectfully request entry 
by the Court of an order in conformance herewith. 
DATED this ~ day of February. 2011. 
DATED this __ day of February. 2011. 
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN. MATTHEWS & 
SHELDON 
by:_I_fl __ 
DATED this -l\. day of FebrlJary. 2011. 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Brian S. Sheldon 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS 
bY~ 
Allen . E . 
STIPULATION - 4 
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By reason o1'lhl..' nbl)\'~ and fon'goillg stipuhttions. th~ lllltkrsigncd respectfully requl..'sl entry 
by the Cnurt Dr an order in cunformance herewith. 
DATED this ~ (by ofF.:bruary. 2011. 
--IMTI~J) this.lS- day of February, 2011. 
PHILLABAUJ\-I. LEDLlN, Ml',n'HEWS &. 
SHELDON 
bY:-,=A:::::"'-"!:""U-_"':::::==:::::-:-
Stephen D. PIll labaum 
Brian S. Sheldon 
HATED this _~_ day or February. 20 II. 
ELLIS. BROWN &. SHEILS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby cel1ifv that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the 
following on this It'd day of February. 20 II by the following method: 
STEPHEN n. PHJLLABAllM 
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, ET AL. 
421 West Riverside. Suite 900 
Spokane, Washington 99201 
Telephone: (509) 838-6055 
Facsimile: (509) 625- J 909 
E-Mail: stevep(q)spokanelaw.com 
A t1orneysf()f' Rimar Construction 
ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS 
707N.81h 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-7832 
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564 
E-Mail: aellis@ebslaw.col11 AllorneysfiJr 
David and Kathy Donnelly 
HONORABLE STEVE VERBY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
2] 5 South 1.1 A venue 
Sandpoint. Idaho 83864 
Telephone: (208) 265-1445 
Facsimile: (208) 263-0896 
E-Mail: n/a 
Presiding .fudge - Courtesy ropy 
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[ dlJ.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 
r 1 Electronic Mail 
[6lJ.S. First Class Mail. Postage Prepaid 
[_] U.S. Ce11itied MaiL Postage Prepaid 
[_] Federal Express 
[_] Hand Delivery 
I_J Facsimile 
LJ Electronic Mail 
[6.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
1_" ] U.S. Certitied Mail. Postage Prepaid 
L] Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
L .. _I Facsimile 
L] Electronic Mai I 
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David P. Claiborne 
=-
JAMES G. REID, ISB # 1372 
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE, ISB # 6579 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 South Third Street 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise. Idaho 83701-2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-mail: dpc@ringertlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMP ANY, an Iowa corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife; and IVAN 
RIMAR, an individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2007-00885 
ORDER ADOPTING STIPULATION 
UPON CONSIDERA nON of the Stipulation, filed ~ I'D, 2011, and good 
cause appearing for entry of the relief requested thereby; 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. That for purposes of this Order only the term "Settlement Agreement" means that certain 
Settlement Agreement entered into between Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company, 
as party of the first part, and Defendants Rimar Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar, as parties 
ORDER ADOPTING STIPULATION - 1 
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of the second part, effective August 17, 2009; and 
2. That, PURSUANT TO Rule 41 (a)(l )(ii), 1.R.c.P., Defendants Rimar Construction, Inc. and 
Ivan Rimar's counterclaims, set forth in RCf's Amended Answer to Plaintiff's Amended 
Petition for Declaratory Judgment, filed on or about July 9, 2009, be and are hereby 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, said dismissal being made to conform with the 
Settlement Agreement; and 
3. That, PURSUANT TO Rule 41(a)(l)(ii), I.R.c.P., Defendant David and Kathy Donnelly's 
counterclaim and cross-claim for fraudulent conveyance, set forth at Section IlLB. of the 
Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Claim against Ivan Rimar and Rimar 
Construction, Inc., filed on or about July 12, 2010, be and is hereby DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE, each party to bear their own costs and fees; and 
4. That Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company and Defendant, Rimar Construction. 
Inc. and Defendant, I van Rimar, shall not assert any defense, whether by claim of avoidance 
or otherwise, in reliance on the Settlement Agreement, and including Hartman v. United 
Heritage Property and Casualty Co., 141 Idaho 193, 1089 P.3d 340 (2005), in this action or 
in any subsequent appeal, to the on-going and continuing standing of the Defendants David 
and Kathy Donnelly, to seek the recovery or payment of monies direct from the Plaintiff, 
Employers Mutual Casualty Company in satisfaction of the Amended Judgment On Special 
Verdict With Regard to Claims of Plaintt/fs And Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. entered 
in Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et aI, Case No. CV-06-00445 (Bonner County, 
Idaho); and 
ORDER ADOPTING STIPULATION - 2 
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5. That the trial date in this action of April 25, 2011 be and is hereby VACATED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED thi~y of February, 2011. 
bY~~ 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby cerj.\iX that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the 
following on this ()\;J day of February, 2011 by the following method: 
STEPHEN D. PHILLABAUM 
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, ET AL. 
421 West Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, Washington 99201 
Telephone: (509) 838-6055 
Facsimile: (509) 625-1909 
E-Mail: stevep@spokanelaw.com 
Attorneys/or Rimar Construction 
ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS 
707 N. 8th 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-7832 
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564 
E-Mail: aellis@ebslaw.com Attorneys/or 
David and Kathy Donnelly 
JAMES G. REID 
DA VID P. CLAIBORNE 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 South Third Street 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-mail: dpc@ringertlaw.com 
Aflorneysfor Plaint(f( 
ORDER ADOPTING STIPULATION - 4 
L::::'J"U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
U U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
U Federal Express 
U Hand Delivery 
U Facsimile 
L] Electronic Mail 
Lfu.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
L] U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
L] Federal Express 
L] Hand Delivery 
L] Facsimile 
L] Electronic Mail 
L-1U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
L] U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
L] Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
L] Facsimile 
U Electronic Mail 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMP ANY, an Iowa corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife; and IVAN 
RIMAR. an individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2007-00885 
JUDGMENT 
UPON CONSIDERATION of the Order Re: Motions for Reconsideration, entered 
November 5. 2010, and the Order Adopting Stipulation, entered herewith, and good cause appearing 
for entry of the relief set forth herein; 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. With respect to Plaintiffs claim for declaratory judgment, it is hereby DECLARED that 
there is no coverage under EMC's insurance policy with Defendants Rimar Construction. 
Inc. and Ivan Rimar for the claims of Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly for damages 
JUDGMENT -1 
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awarded due to breach of the implied warranty of workmanship and/or violations of the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act in the matter of Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et aI., 
Case No. CV-06-00445 (Bonner County, Idaho); and 
2. With respect to Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly's claim for declaratory judgment, it 
is hereby DECLARED that there is coverage under EMC's insurance policy with 
Defendants Rimar Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar for the claims of Defendants David and 
Kathy Donnelly for attorney fees and court costs awarded in the matter of Donnelly v. Rimar 
Construction, Inc., et aI., Case No. CV-06-00445 (Bonner County, Idaho); and 
3. With respect to any and all other claims of any of the parties advanced in this action, each 
and every such claim be and is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, each party to 
bear their own costs and fees. 







RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED. in accordance with Rule 54(b), l.R.c.p" that the court has determined that there is 
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby 
direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue 
and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
IT IS SO ORDERED thi5~y of February, 2011. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ceJ3 that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the 
following on this day of February, 2011 by the following method: 
STEPHEN D. PHILLABAUM 
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, ET AL. 
421 West Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, Washington 99201 
Telephone: (509) 838-6055 
Facsimile: (509) 625-1909 
E-Mail: stevep@spokanelaw.com 
Attorneys/or Rimar Construction 
ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS 
707 N. 8th 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-7832 
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564 
E-Mail: aellis@ebslaw.com 
Allorneysfor David and Kathy Donnelly 
JAMES G. REID 
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 South Third Street 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 8370] -2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-mail: dpc@ringertlaw.com 
Attorneysfor Plainltf! 
JUDGMENT - 4 
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L] U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
L] Facsimile 
L] Electronic Mail 
L.::]lJ.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[_J U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 
LJ Electronic Mail 
rSu.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
L] Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 
L] Electronic Mail 
Deputy Clerk 
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JAMES G. REID, ISB # 1372 
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE, ISB # 6579 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 South Third Street 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-mail: jgr@ringertlaw.com 
E-mail: dbc@ringertlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation; 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
R/MAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; IVAN RIMAR, an individual; and 
DAVID and KA THY DONNELLY, husband 
and wife; 
Defendants/Respondent 
Case No. CV-2007 -00885 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, David and Kathy Donnelly, and your 
attorney of record; and the Clerk of the above-titled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, appeals against 
the above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment (including any 
relevant adverse pre-trial rulings, procedural rulings and evidentiary rulings), entered in the above-
entitled action on the 23rd day of February, 2011, Honorable Steve Verby, District Judge, 
presiding. 
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2. The Appellant is represented by James G. Reid and David P. Claiborne of Ringert 
Law Chartered, 455 S. Third Street, Boise, 10 83701, telephone (208) 342-4591, email 
jgr@ringertlaw.com and dpc@ringertlaw.com. 
3. The Respondents are represented by Allen B. Ellis, Ellis, Brown & Sheils, 707 N. 8th 
Street, Boise, 1083701, telephone (208) 345-7832, email aellis@ebslaw.com. 
4. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 
11(a)(1),I.A.R. 
5. Appellant provides the following as a preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: 
Did the District Court err in determining that Appellant insurance company had a duty under an 
insurance contract supplemental payments provision to make payments to the Respondent 
Claimants on claims not covered by the insurance contract. 
6. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
7. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record, 
in addition to those automatically included in the Clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28 I.A. R.: 
(a) Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed May 24,2007. 
(b) Defendant Donnellys' Answer filed July 18, 2007. 
(c) Defendant Rimar Construction's Answer to Plaintiff's Petition for' Declaratory 
Judgment, Counterclaim and Request for Jury Trial filed August 1, 2007. 
(d) Plaintiff's Amended Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed November 7, 
2007. 
(e) Order Staying Plaintiffs Declaratory Judgment Action filed December 12, 
2007. 
(f) Notice of Hearing on Motion to Vacate Order Staying Plaintiff's Declaratory 
Judgment Action filed March 12,2009. 
(g) Defendant Rimar Construction's Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate 
Order Staying Plaintiffs Declaratory Judgment Action filed April 1, 2009. 
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(h) Judge's Ruling on Motion to Lift Stay (Hearing held on April 8, 2009) 
(i) Plaintiffs Second Motion to Vacate Order Staying Declaratory Judgment 
Action filed May 22,2009. 
U) Defendant Donnellys' Objection to EMC's Motion to Lift Stay filed June 29, 
2009. 
(k) Plaintiffs Non-Opposition to Vacating Stay and Stipulation to Allow Filing of 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim filed July 7,2009. 
(I) Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Second Motion to 
Vacate Order Staying Plaintiffs Declaratory Judgment Action filed July 7, 
2009. 
(m) Defendant Rimar Construction's Amended Answer to Amended Petition for 
Declaratory Judgment and Counterclaim filed July 10, 2009. 
(n) Plaintiff's Reply to Counterclaim filed July 15, 2009. 
(0) Order Vacating Stay of Plaintiffs Declaratory Judgment Action filed July 17, 
2009. 
(p) Plaintiffs Motion for Summary judgment filed November 12,2009. 
(q) Affidavit of James G. Reid filed November 12, 2009. 
(r) Statement of Facts filed November 12, 2009. 
(s) Memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed November 
12,2009. 
(t) Defendant Donnellys' Motion for Summary Judgment filed December 22, 
2009. 
(u) Affidavit in Support of Defendant Donnellys' Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed December 22,2009. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
(v) Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed December 
22,2009; 
(w) Defendant Donnellys' Amended Answer and Counterclaim filed December 
23,2009. 
(x) Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Donnellys' Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed January 7,2010. 
(y) Defendant Donnellys' Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition filed January 14,2010. 
(z) Plaintiffs Reply to Counterclaim January 21, 2010. 
(aa) Order denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment filed April 7, 2010. 
(bb) Defendant Donnellys' Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Motions for 
Summary Judgment filed July 8,2010. 
(cc) Defendant Donnellys' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration filed July 8, 2010. 
(dd) Defendant Donnellys' Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross 
Claim filed July 13, 2010. 
(ee) Plaintiffs Reply to Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Claim 
filed July 26, 2010. 
(ff) Reply of Rimar Construction and Ivan Rimar to Second Amended Answer, 
Counterclaim and Cross Claim filed August 13, 2010. 
(gg) Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration filed August 23, 2010. 
(hh) Plaintiffs Memorandum re: Motions for Reconsideration filed August 23, 
2010. 
(ii) Defendant Donnellys' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration filed September 1, 2010. 
OJ) Order re: Motion for Reconsideration filed November 5, 2010. 
(kk) Supplemental Order re: Motions for Reconsideration filed February 4,2011. 
(II) Stipulation filed February 18, 2011. 
(mm) Order Adopting Stipulation filed February 23, 2011. 
(nn) Judgment filed February 23, 2011. 
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8. I certify: 
(a) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid. 
(b) That the Appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This does hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 2011, he served the foregoing 
document by placing a true and correct copy in the United States Mail, postage prepaid and 
properly addressed as follows: 
Allen Ellis 
Ellis, Brown & Sheils 
707 N. 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, 10 83701 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
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STATE OF iU"'"i ,. 
ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB. No. 1626 
COU LlTY OF B It,,,,-n fl" L f~ tt t:_1·\ 
FIRST JUDIClAL OIST. 
2011 MAR -u P 2: 3'1 
Attorneys for Defendants, David Donnelly and Kathy Donnelly 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY ) 






RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; and DA VID DONNELLY) 





Case No. CV-2007-00885 
MOTION TO AMEND 
JUDGMENT (RULE 59(e), I.R.C.P.) 
Come now the defendants Kathy Donnelly and David Donnelly, through their attorney of 
, record, and move the Court to amend the judgment in this matter to include a money judgment in 
favor of defendants Donnelly and against plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty ("EMC'') in the 
amount of$296,933.89, i.e., the judgment of attorney fees and costs which plaintiffs were awarded 
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in the underlying matter of Donnelly v. Rimar, et al (Bonner County Case No. CV ~2006-445) which 
is consistent with the judgment entered in this matter on February 23, 2011, to the effect that plaintiff 
EMC is obligated for this amount. 
This motion is based upon the memorandum oflaw filed herewith, the affidavit of Allen B. 
Ellis, the pleadings and records in this matter and such other oral and documentary evidence as may 
be presented at the time of hearing. 
DATED This 4th day of March, 2011. 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 4th day March, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the meth<?d indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Jame3 G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Law Chartered 
455 South Third Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT - 2 
Allen B. Ellis 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
__ Hand delivery 
__ Overnight delivery 
-L Facsimile (342-4657) 
JAMES G. REID, ISB # 1372 
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE. ISB # 6579 
RrNGERT LAW CHARTERED 
4SS South Third Street 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise. Idaho 83701-2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-mail: dpc@ringertlaw.com 
~lN(jt:.~1 LAW 
STATE g~ Wt~H~R 
F~~~~TJ~OICIAL 0I5T. 
, til M~R \ 1 A l\: U q 
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I 
Attorneys for Plaintiff I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT dF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNE 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMP ANY~ an Iowa coIJ>oration; 
Plainti~ 
VS. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
co!pOration; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife; and IVAN 
RIMAR, an individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2007-00885 
MOTION TO DJSALLOW OSTS AND 
FEES 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, byland through its 
attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and, PURSUANT TO Rules 54( d)(6j and 54(e)(6) of 
the IDAHO RULES OF ClVIL PROCEDURE, MOVES THE COURT to disallow all ~the court costs 
and attorney fees requested by Defen.dants David and Kathy Donnelly by way ofthe~r Memorandum 
I 
olCosts and Fees, served March 3,2011. I 
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum In Support of Motion to DiSrllOW COSls and 




Fet,. and the AffiJavtl of Counsel In Support of Motion 10 DiSQ//fJW Com Qnd Fe~, each of which 
is filed herewith. Tnis Motion is further supported by the pleadings, affidavits, recird of action, and 
all other materials and documents on file with the Court in this action. 
Oral argument on this Motion is respectfully requested. 
DATED this 1'P' day of March, 2011. 
RINOERT LAW CHARTERED 
by: Q · ~:;;:ar;::~ ~ 
James G. Reid I 
David P. Claiborne 
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C"ERTmCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a tIUe and correct copy of the foregoing document served on the 
following on this 1'P' day of March, 2011 by the following method: I 
ALLEN B. EWS U U.S. First Class Mail, poige Prepaid 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Pos~e Prepaid 
707 N. 8th LJ Federal Express 
P.O. Box 388 LX.J Hand Delivery 
Boise, ID 83701 L.J Facsimile 
Telephone: (208) 34S~7832 U Electronic Mail 
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564 
ENMai1: aellis@ebslaw.com Attorneys for 
David and Kathy Donnelly 
HONORABLE STEVE VERBY 
DISTRICT .JUDGE 
215 South lit Avenue 
Sandpoint. Idaho 83864 
Telephone: (208) 265-1445 
Facsimile: (208) 263-0896 
E-Mail: n/a 
Presiding Judge - Courtesy Copy 
LX.J U.S. First Class Mail, P stag. Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Pos~e Prepai.d 
LJ Federal Express , 
LJ Hand Delivery I 
U Facsimile 
Ll Electronic Mail I 
David P. Claiborne 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES· 3 
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In the Sup· reme Court of thecSTf~cl~1D'1~tdaho 
FIRST JUW ,Al :~ I. 




DAVID DONNELLY and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
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ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38623-2011 
Bonner County Docket No. 2007-885 
The Notice of Appeal in the above captioned matter filed in this Court March 
16,2011, requested that a Reporter's Transcript be prepared. However, the Notice of Appeal failed 
to comply with Idaho Appellate Rules 17(0)(5)(b) and 25(a) in that it did not specifically list the 
date(s) and title(s) of the hearing(s) required to be transcribed for purposes of this Appeal: 
therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant shall file an AMENDED NOTICE OF 
APPEAL which complies with Idaho Appellate Rules 17(0)(5)(b) and 25(a), and shall specify the 
date(s) and title(s) title of the hearing(s) required to be transcribe-lfor purposes of this Appeal. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDER that Appellant shall serve the Reporter(s) with a copy of 
the Amended Notice of Appeal and shall indicate in the Amended Notice of Appeal which 
reporter( s) was served. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED the Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed with the 
District Court within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order. In the event an Amended 
Notice of Appeal is not filed, this appeal may proceed on the Clerk's Record ONL Y .• 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that this appeal is SUSPENDED until further notice. 
ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL - Docket No. 38623-2011 
, "' 
DATED this _ :; I day of March 2011. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
For the Supreme Court 
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II 
JAMES G. REID, ISB # 1372 
DA VID P. CLAIBORNE, ISB # 6579 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 South Third Street 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-mail: jgr@ringertlaw.com 
E-mail: dpc@ringertlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
ORIGINAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
FIRST JUDICIAL DIST. 
I zon MAR 30 A If) 0' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
L '1-~()/,~ 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation; 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38623-2011 
Bonner County Case No. CV-2007-885 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
corporation; IVAN RIMAR, an individual; 
and DAVID and KATHY DONNELLY, 
husband and wife; 
DefendantslRespondent 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, David and Kathy Donnelly, and your 
attorney of record; and the Clerk of the above-titled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, appeals against 
the above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment (including any 
relevant adverse pre-trial rulings, procedural rulings and evidentiary rulings), entered in the above-
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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entitled action on the 23rd day ofF ebruary, 2011, Honorable Steve Verby, District Judge, presiding. 
2. The App~llant is represented by James G. Reid and David P. Claiborne of Ringert 
Law Chartered, 455 S. Third Street, Boise, ID 83701, telephone (208) 342-4591, email 
jgr@ringertlaw.com and dpc@ringertlaw.com. 
3. The Respondents are represented by Allen B. Ellis, Ellis, Brown & Sheils, 707 N. 8th 
Street, Boise, ID 83701, telephone (208) 345-7832, email aellis@ebslaw.com. 
4. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(1), 
I.A.R. 
5. Appellant provides the following as a preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: 
Did the District Court err in determining that Appellant insurance company had a duty under an 
insurance contract supplemental payments provision to make payments to the Respondent Claimants 
on claims not covered by the insurance contract. 
6. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? No. 
7. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record, 
in addition to those automatically included in the Clerk's record pursuant to Rule 281.A. R.: 
(a) Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed May 24, 2007. 
(b) Defendant Donnellys' Answer filed July 18, 2007. 
(c) Defendant Rimar Construction's Answer to Plaintiffs Petition for Declaratory 
Judgment, Counterclaim and Request for Jury Trial filed August 1,2007. 
(d) Plaintiffs Amended Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed November 7, 
2007. 
(e) Order Staying Plaintiffs Declaratory Judgment Action filed December 12, 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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2007. 
(f) Notice of Hearing on Motion to Vacate Order Staying Plaintiffs Declaratory 
Judgment Action filed March 12,2009. 
(g) Defendant Rimar Construction's Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate 
Order Staying Plaintiffs Declaratory Judgment Action filed April 1,2009. 
(h) Judge's Ruling on Motion to Lift Stay (Hearing held on April 8, 2009) 
(i) Plaintiffs Second Motion to Vacate Order Staying Declaratory Judgment 
Action filed May 22, 2009. 
G) Defendant Donnellys' Objection to EMC's Motion to Lift Stay filed June 29, 
2009. 
(k) Plaintiffs Non-Opposition to Vacating Stay and Stipulation to Allow Filing 
of Amended Answer and Counterclaim filed July 7, 2009. 
(1) Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Second Motion to 
Vacate Order Staying Plaintiffs Declaratory Judgment Action filed July 7, 
2009. 
(m) Defendant Rimar Construction's Amended Answer to Amended Petition for 
Declaratory Judgment and Counterclaim filed July 10,2009. 
(n) Plaintiffs Reply to Counterclaim filed July 15,2009. 
(0) Order Vacating Stay of Plaintiffs Declaratory Judgment Action filed July 17, 
2009. 
(p) Plaintiffs Motion for Summary judgment filed November 12, 2009. 
(q) Affidavit of James G. Reid filed November 12,2009. 
(r) Statement of Facts filed November 12,2009. 
(s) Memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed November 
12,2009. 
(t) Defendant Donnellys' Motion for Summary Judgment filed December 22, 
2009. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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· . 
(u) Affidavit inSupport of Defendant Donnellys' Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed December 22,2009. 
(v) Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed December 
22,2009. 
(w) Defendant Donnellys' Amended Answer and Counterclaim filed December 
23,2009. . 
(x) Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Donnellys' Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed January 7, 2010. 
(y) Defendant Donnellys' Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition filed January 14,2010. 
(z) Plaintiffs Reply to Counterclaim January 21, 2010. 
(aa) Order denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment filed April 7, 2010. 
(bb) Defendant DonneUys' Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Motions for 
Summary Judgment filed July 8, 2010. 
(cc) Defendant Donnellys' Memorandum III Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration filed July 8,2010. 
(dd) Defendant Donnellys' Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross 
Claim filed July 13,2010. 
(ee) Plaintiffs Reply to Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Claim 
filed July 26, 2010. 
(ft) Reply ofRimar Construction and Ivan Rimar to Second Amended Answer, 
Counterclaim and Cross Claim filed August 13,2010. 
(gg) Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration filed August 23,2010. 
(bb) Plaintiffs Memorandum re: Motions for Reconsideration filed August 23, 
2010. 
(ii) Defendant Donnellys' Reply Memorandum III Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration filed September 1, 2010. 
(jj) Order re: Motion for Reconsideration filed November 5, 2010. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
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· . . 
(kk) S upplementai Order re: Motions for Reconsideration filed February 4, 2011. 
(ll) Stipulation filed Febrm.uy ] 8,2011. 
(rum) Order Adopting Stipulation filed February 23, 2011. 
(nn) Judgment filed February 23,2011. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid. 
(b) That the Appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this 28th day of March, 2011. 
By 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
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Q- VU-'*'d-:?"> 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This does hereby certify that on the 28th day of March, 2011, he served the foregoing 
document by placing a true and correct copy in the United States Mail, postage prepaid and properly 
addressed as follows: 
Allen Ellis 
Ellis, Brown & Sheils 
707 N. 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701 
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ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB. No. 1626 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
FIRST JUDICIAL DIST. 
2ml MAR 30 A Irl' 2S 
Attorneys for Defendants/Cross-Appellants (Donnelly) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation, 
Appellant/Respondent, 
vs. 
DA VID DONNELLY and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife, 
Respondents-Cross Appellants, 
and 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an 























Case No. CV-2007-00885 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS, Employers Mutual 
Casualty: 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 1 
538 ORIGINAL 
I • " 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Respondents/Cross Appellants, David Donnelly and Kathy 
Donnelly, appeal against the above named AppellantlRespondent to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Judgment (including any relevant adverse pre-trial rulings, 
procedural rulings and evidentiary rulings), entered in the above-entitled action on 
the 23 rd of February, 2011, Honorable Steve Verby, District Judge, presiding. 
2. The Respondents/Cross Appellants are represented by Allen B. Ellis of Ellis, Brown 
& Sheils, Chtd., P.O. Box 388, Boise, Idaho, 83701. 
3. The Appellant/Cross-Respondent is represented by James G. Reid and David P. 
Claiborne of Ringert Law Chartered, 455 S. Third Street, Boise, Idaho 83701. 
4. . Thatthe parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
or orders described in paragraph I above are appealable orders under and pursuant 
to Rule 11(a)(1), I.A.R. 
5. Respondents/Cross-Appellants provide the following as a preliminary statement of 
the issue on appeal: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that damages 
assessed against Rimar Construction, Inc., for breach of the implied warranty of 
workmanship in the underlying action are not covered under the subject insurance 
policy. 
6. An additional reporter's transcript is not requested. 
7. Documents to be included in clerk's record in addition those designated by appellant 
in the initial notice of appeal: None. 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2 
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8. I certify: 
(a) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(b) That service has been made upon all other parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED This 28" day of March, 2011. ~ 
A-I-Ie-n-B~~~I~h~S~r--+-------------------­
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 28th day of March, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Law Chartered 
455 South Third Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 3 
Allen B. Ell 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 





) CASE NO. CV-2007-0000885 
v. ) 
) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife, 
) MOTION TO DISALLOW 






On February 23, 2011, a Judgment was entered in the above-entitled matter, which decreed 
as follows: 
1. With respect to the claim of Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company (hereafter, 
"EMC") for declaratory judgment, there is no coverage under EMC's insurance policy 
with Defendants Rimar Construction, Inc. (hereafter, "RCI") and Ivan Rimar for the 
claims of Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly for damages awarded due to breach of 
the implied warranty of workmanship and/or violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES - 1 
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Act in the underlying litigation, Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., Bonner 
County Case No. CV-2006-0445. 
2. With respect to the Donnellys' claim for declaratory judgment, there is coverage under 
EMC's insurance policy with RCI and Ivan Rimar for the claims of the Donnellys for 
attorney's fees and court costs awarded in the underlying litigation. 
3. With respect to any and all other claims of any of the parties advanced in this action, each 
and every claim is dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear their own costs and fees. 
On March 4, 2011, the Donnellys filed a "Motion to Amend Judgment," requesting that 
the Court amend the judgment, pursuant to I.R.c.P. 59(e), to include a money judgment in their 
favor and against EMC in the amount of $296,933.89, which is the judgment of attorney's fees 
and costs which the Donnellys were awarded in the underlying litigation. At a hearing on April 
20, 2011, on the record, the Court denied the motion to amend the judgment. 
On March 8, 2011, the Donnellys filed a "Memorandum of Costs and Fees," in which 
they contend they are entitled to an award of $70,481.25 in costs and attorney's fees expended in 
litigating this declaratory judgment action pursuant to either I.C. § 41-1839 or I.C. § 12-120(3). 
On March 17,2011, EMC filed a "Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees," which disputes 
the applicability of either statute to award the Donnellys attorney's fees and costs in this matter. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court set forth 
the standard of review for a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend ajudgment, as follows: 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES - 2 
The Court reviews an order denying a motion to alter or amend judgment for 
abuse of discretion. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 707, 979 P.2d 
107, 109 (1999). Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e), a district court can correct legal and 
factual errors occurring in proceedings before it. Id 
Id at 71, 175 P.3d at 760. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Idaho Code § 41-1839 Is Not Applicable To This Case. 
Idaho Code § 41-1839, which governs the allowance of attorney's fees in suits against 
insurers provides, in part: 
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, 
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a 
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in 
such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the 
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action 
thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state or in any arbitration 
for recovery under the tenns of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further 
amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action or 
arbitration. 
I.C. § 41-1839(1). 
In Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168 (1996), the Idaho Supreme 
Court stated: 
Idaho Code 41-1839 provides for the award of attorney fees if the 
insurance company fails to pay an amount justly due under the policy within 
thirty days after proof of loss. But, before an insured can recover attorney fees 
under the statute, an action in court must be brought to recover under the 
terms of the insurance policy. I.e. § 41-1839; ... 
Id at 404,913 P.2d at 1174. (Emphasis supplied). 
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In this case, the Donnellys are not an insured under EMC's insurance policy with RCI 
and Ivan Rimar. Therefore, I.e. § 41-1839 is not applicable to this matter. Even if the statute 
was applicable, because the Donnellys provided no evidence that "proof of loss has been 
furnished as provided in such policy," the requirements of I.e. § 41-1839 were not met, and thus, 
the Donnellys are not entitled to recover attorney's fees pursuant to this statute. 
B. The Donnellys Are Not Entitled To Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
In In re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 146 Idaho 527, 199 P.3d 102 (2008), the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) ... grants the prevailing party the right to an award of a 
reasonable attorney's fee in "any civil action to recover ... in any commercial 
transaction." The statute applies to declaratory judgment actions if the 
gravamen of the action is a commercial transaction. Freiburger v. J-U-B 
Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 423, 111 P.3d 100, 108 (2005). "The term 
'commercial transaction' is defined to mean all transactions except transactions 
for personal and household purposes." I.C. § 12-120(3) .... 
"Idaho Code § 12-120(3) does not require that there be a contract 
between the parties before the statute is applied; the statute 'only requires 
that there be a commercial transaction." Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest 
Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 472, 36 P.3d 218, 224 (2001) .... 
Id at 541, 199 P.3d at 116. (Emphasis supplied). 
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This declaratory judgment action was brought to determine rights and obligations under 
an insurance policy between EMC and RCUlvan Rimar. The Donnellys were included in this 
action not because of any commercial relationship with EMC, but rather as a proper party as the 
claimant to potential policy proceeds. Here, a commercial relationship exists between EMC and 
RCUIvan Rimar, but no such relationship exists between the Donnellys and EMC. Accordingly, 
in the absence of a commercial transaction directly between the Donnellys and EMC, the 
Donnellys are not entitled to the recovery of attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, EMC's motion to disallow costs and fees 
is GRANTED, and the Donnellys' request for attorney's fees and costs is denied. 
ITIS SO ORDERED. 
~ 
DATED this 2.t) day of May, 2011. 
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Casualty: 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Respondents/Cross Appellants, David Donnelly and Kathy 
Donnelly, appeal against the above named Appellant/Respondent to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Judgment (including any relevant adverse pre-trial rulings, 
procedural rulings and evidentiary rulings), entered in the above-entitled action on 
the 23rd of February, 2011, Honorable Steve Verby, District Judge, presiding and 
from the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees signed May 
20~ 2011, by the Honorable Steve Yerby, District Judge. 
2. The Respondents/Cross Appellants are represented by Allen B. Ellis of Ellis, Brown 
& Sheils, Chtd., P.O. Box 388, Boise, Idaho, 83701. 
3. The Appellant/Cross-Respondent is represented by James G. Reid and David P. 
Claiborne of Ringert Law Chartered, 455 S. Third Street, Boise, Idaho 83701. 
4. That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant 
to Rule II(a)(l), I.A.R. 
5. Respondents/Cross-Appellants provide the following as a preliminary statement of 
the issue on appeal: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that damages 
assessed against Rimar Construction, Inc., for breach of the implied warranty of 
workmanship in the underlying action are not covered under the subject insurance 
policy. 
6. An additional reporter's transcript is not requested. 
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7. Documents to be included in clerk's record in addition those designated by appellant 
in the initial notice of appeal: None. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(b) That service has been made upon all other parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 . 
. DATED This 27th day of May, 2011. 
AlIenB.fIlL 
Attorney for Defendants 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 27th day of May, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
James G. Reid 
Da.vid P. Claiborne 
Ringert Law Chartered 
455 South Third Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
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an Idaho Corporation; and DAVID ) 
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I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was 
compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the 
pleadings and documents requested by Appellant Rule 28. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this ,9()~ day of June, 2011. 
Marie Scott 
Clerk's Certuicate 
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I,Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that the following is offered as the 
Clerk's Exhibit on Appeal: 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed August 17, 2007. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Proceedings filed September 4, 2007. 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Stay Proceedings filed September 12, 2007. 
Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc.'s Memorandum Joining with Defendants 
Donnellys' Motion to Stay Proceedings & Responding to Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Stay Proceedings filed September 14, 2007. 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Defendant Rimar 
Construction's Counterclaim filed September 14, 2007. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended 
Petition filed November 7, 2007. 
Affidavit of Peter J. Johnson in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plainilif's 
Amended Petition filed November 7, 2007. 
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Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Proceedings filed 
November 9, 2007. 
Memorandum in Opposition to Rimar's Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition filed 
November 28, 2007. 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Stay Proceedings filed 
November 28, 2007. 
Rimar Construction's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended 
Petition filed November 30, 2007. 
Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc.' s Response Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Peter J. Johnson filed November 30, 2007. 
Supplemental Affidavit of Peter J. Johnson in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed November 
30,2007. 
Rimar Construction's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended 
Petition filed April 1, 2009. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended 
Petition filed April 1, 2009. 
Memorandum in Support of Second Motion to Vacate Order Staying Plaintiff's 
Declaratory Action filed May 22, 2011. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed November, 12,2009. 
Affidavit of Michael A. Ealy in Support of Motion to Amend Answer and 
Counterclaim filed November 25, 2009. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Answer filed November 25, 2011. 
Letter to Clerk of the Court from Michael A. Ealy filed December 18, 2011. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Permissive Appeal filed April 19, 2010. 
Affidavit of Michael A. Ealy in Support of Motion to Amend Answer and 
Counterclaim filed June 21, 2010. 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Donnelly's Motion to Amend Answer 
and Counterclaim filed July 6, 2010. 
Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits - 2 -
Verified Memorandum in Support of Motion for Extension of Time and 
Continuance of Hearing filed July 8, 2010. 
Memorandum RE: Motions for Reconsideration filed August 23,2010. 
Letter to Judge from Michael A. Ealy filed November 2,2010. 
Affidavit of Michael A. Ealy in Support of Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of 
Record filed December 16, 2010. 
Letter to Judge Verby from David P. Claiborne filed December 20,2010. 
Letter to -Clerk from Kathy L. K. Donnelly filed December 27, 2010. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Judgment (Rule 59(e), 1.R.c.P.) filed 
March 4,2010. 
Affidavit of Allen B. Ellis filed March 4,2010. 
Affidavit of Michael G. Schmidt in Support of Defendants Donnelly's Claim for 
Attorney Fees and Costs filed March 8,2011. 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees filed March 8,2011. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees filed March 21, 
2010. 
Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees 
filed March 21, 2010. 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend Judgment filed April 8, 2010. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court this £~day of ~u< ,2011. 
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